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I. INTRODUCTION
Employee ownership of enterprise has become a prominent focus of
public policy and private action both in the United States and abroad.
This is the result, in considerable part, of an unusual convergence of eco-
nomic thought from opposite ends of the political spectrum. On the left,
recent years have brought the sudden and virtually complete collapse of
state socialism as an economic ideal in both the East and the West.' In the
resulting ideological void, "workplace democracy" has emerged as the
principal institutional reform that today commands widespread support
among critics of capitalism; worker control of enterprise, it is hoped, will
succeed where state control has failed in equalizing power and wealth and
in decreasing worker alienation and exploitation.2 Reformers on the right,
in turn, have become increasingly discouraged with the efficiency of tradi-
tional forms of labor-management relations. For an alternative, many
have turned to employee ownership, hoping that it will improve produc-
tivity and increase worker identification with the interests of capital.3
1. I refer here principally to the remarkable events of the last decade, during which Western
European socialist parties have largely abandoned nationalization of industry as a plank in their
platforms, communist Cuba and China have been eclipsed by capitalist Japan, Taiwan, Singapore,
and South Korea as popular models for development throughout most of the Third World, the gov-
ernments of the Soviet Union and China have effectively declared that state ownership of enterprise
must be abandoned as a failure, and-most recently and spectacularly-the countries of Eastern Eu-
rope have begun to shift rapidly toward market economies.
2. E.g., P. BERNSTEIN, WORKPLACE DEMOCRATIZATION: ITS INTERNAL DYNAMICS (1976); S.
BOWLES & H. GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM (1986); M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, Eco-
NOMIC DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1980's (1980); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY (1985); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 116-19, 291-303 (1983); SELF-
MANAGEMENT: ECONOMIC LIBERATION OF MAN (J. Vanek ed. 1975); WORKER COOPERATIVES IN
AMERICA (R. Jackall & H. Levin eds. 1984).
3. The most influential proponent on the right in the U.S. has been Louis Kelso. See L. KELSO &
MI. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); L. KELSO & P. HETTER, How To TURN
EIGHTY MILLION WORKERS INTO CAPITALISTS ON BORROWED MONEY (1967); L. KELSO & P.
HETTER, Two-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY (1967). Kelso's appeal to the popu-
list right, particularly in the person of the late Senator Russell Long, has played an important role in
the enactment of the substantial preferences for employee stock ownership plans that have been incor-
porated into Federal tax and pension law.
Whether out of principle or opportunism, many in the financial community now extol the virtues of
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In the United States, current efforts to promote worker ownership4
have focused heavily on employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) through
which workers invest in their own company's stock. There are now
roughly 10,000 companies with such plans, including perhaps 1000 or
more in which the ESOP holds a majority of the firm's stock, and their
numbers continue to grow rapidly.' The ESOP movement has been
strongly fueled by a variety of Federal and state legislative enactments.6
Most important among these is a series of large Federal tax subsidies
created since the mid-1970's. It is testimony to the popularity of the
ESOP concept that these subsidies, almost alone among substantial tax
preferences, survived the 1986 Tax Reform Act not only unscathed but
strengthened. Yet ESOPs have also attracted strong critics, and the poli-
cies that support them are becoming the subject of increasing controversy.7
Worker ownership in the United States has by no means been confined
to ESOPs, however. Long before the advent of ESOPs, employee owner-
ship was already the prevailing form of organization in a number of sig-
nificant U.S. industries. Most conspicuous among these are the service
professions, including law, accounting, investment banking, management
consulting, advertising, architecture, engineering, and medicine. Although
discussions of worker ownership commonly focus on industrial firms and
rarely make reference to the partnerships and professional corporations
that populate the service professions, such firms are among the world's
worker ownership. For example, commenting on the conversion of a tugboat manufacturer to worker
ownership with union management, Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.-then at the
peak of his influence-said:
The movement to ownership by the unions is the latest step in the progression from man-
agement ownership to employee ownership. It is part of what I call the democratization of
capital. . . . When the employees own the company, productivity is higher, investment is
higher and the chances of the company being successful are greater.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
4. I shall use the terms "worker ownership" and "employee ownership" interchangeably here.
This means, in particular, that I shall not use the term "worker" to refer only to blue-collar workers,
nor shall I use the term "employee" to suggest that the individuals involved necessarily have a con-
tractual relationship with the firm that provides them with a salary in addition to whatever share they
have in earnings as owners.
5. See infra Section VII(A).
6. At the Federal level, in addition to the tax subsidies discussed immediately below and infra at
text accompanying note 157, these include the partial exemptions from diversification requirements
and self-dealing prohibitions contained in Federal pension regulation. See Doernberg & Macey,
ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 107-08 (1986). In addition, at least
19 states have passed legislation encouraging employee ownership, including tax preferences, loans
and loan guarantees, and special employee cooperative corporation statutes. See Employee Benefit
Research Institute, Issue Brief, Jan. 1988, at 25.
7. For analyses critical of the ESOP concept, see Levin, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism:
Congress and the Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 148 (1985); Doernberg
& Macey, supra note 6. Both these analyses, though thoughtful, are conventional in emphasizing the
problems of illiquidity and risk discussed infra Section IV-problems which, as noted in that Section,
are perhaps not so serious as these and other authors suggest-and largely ignore both the benefits of
worker ownership discussed infra Section III and the costs of control discussed infra Sections V and
VI.
ESOPs recently have become the subject of increasing critical scrutiny in the popular press as well.
See, e.g., ESOPs: Are They Good For You?, Bus. WK., May 15, 1989, at 116-23.
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purest examples of worker ownership. Moreover, the industries in which
they are found are virtually the only industries, not just in the U.S. but in
any country, that are dominated by worker-owned firms. Yet recent in-
creases in the scale and scope of the services provided by the firms in these
industries, together with alterations in the market environment in which
those firms operate, have caused investor ownership to begin to replace
employee ownership. In the legal profession, in particular, there is in-
creasing pressure to abandon the rules, which currently have the force of
law in every state, that require all law firms to be owned exclusively by
the lawyers that practice in them-that is, to be worker-owned.8
Worker ownership has also been a prominent focus of attention outside
the United States.9 France and Italy both have substantial and growing
numbers of worker cooperatives in their industrial sectors, encouraged in
both countries by special governmental benefits. Britain has recently ex-
perimented actively, through both public and private action, with indus-
trial worker cooperatives. And the large complex of prosperous worker
cooperatives at Mondragon in Spain is now widely considered the text-
book model for successful employee ownership of industrial enterprise.
Accompanying these efforts at full worker ownership have been important
steps to expand employee participation in corporate control in general
through legislation that grants workers rights that verge on co-ownership.
Most conspicuous in this regard is Germany, which has adopted a system
of codetermination under which workers in all large corporations are enti-
tled to elect up to half of the company's board of directors. A similar
regime has been proposed for the European Economic Community as a
whole, to become part of the corporation law of all member states, and
remains the subject of active debate.
Nor has interest in worker ownership been confined to capitalist coun-
tries. Both the Soviet Union and China are focusing on worker ownership
as a first step in their astonishing efforts to privatize their economies.'x In
several Eastern European countries, reform movements have long been
pressing for worker control of enterprise." And at the same time, Yugo-
slavia, which has mandated worker management as the norm in its econ-
omy for several decades, is beginning to subject that form of organization
to increasingly critical scrutiny.' 2
8. See infra Section X(D).
9. See infra Section II(B).
10. See Xu Jing'an, The Stock-Share System: A New Avenue for China's Economic Reform, 11 J.
CoiP. EcoN. 509, 509-14 (1987); Kuteinikov, The Emerging Soviet Private Sector, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 15, 1989, at AI0, col. 3; Keller, Going Co-op: At the Soviet Economic Frontier, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 26, 1988, §1, at 1, col. 3.
11. See, e.g., Norr, Self-Management and the Politics of Solidarity in Poland, in WORK R PAR-
TICIPATION AND THE POLITICs OF REFORM 267 (C. Sirianni ed. 1987). Solidarity's commitment to
worker control has become less apparent, however, now that it has backed the effort to transform
Poland overnight into a market economy.
12. Protests Swell as Yugoslav Economy Stalls: Painful Cure Promised for Tito's Unworkable
1990] 1753
The Yale Law Journal
For all of the interest and controversy that worker ownership has stim-
ulated, and for all of the legislation that has been enacted to promote it,
current scholarship does not provide a satisfactory account of the existing
distribution of worker-owned firms across industries,1" much less of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of employee ownership in general. I be-
lieve that an important reason for this is that previous analyses have been
mistaken in their assessment of the most significant costs and benefits of
worker ownership, and in particular have largely neglected a critical con-
sideration: the costs of collective decision-making, or what we might term
the internal politics of the firm.14 In this article I develop these themes
and explore their implications, not just for worker ownership and the pol-
icies that promote it, but for the full range of means by which workers
can participate in earnings or control, including ESOPs, codetermination,
labor representation on corporate boards, and collective bargaining. In the
course of the analysis I seek to shed particular light on the evolving struc-
ture of the sector in which worker ownership is most heavily concentrated,
namely the service professions. In this connection I try not only to illumi-
nate the reasons for recent changes in patterns of ownership, but also to
provide a better explanation than has previously been given for some im-
portant aspects of the internal organization of firms, such as why it is that
law firms so often share earnings equally among partners of a given age,
or why they have so much difficulty accommodating as partners women
who wish to have children.
The analysis begins in Section II with a description of the various
forms that worker ownership takes and the frequency with which those
forms appear in different industries and different countries. The following
Sections then offer a systematic assessment of the benefits and costs of
worker ownership, and of the degree to which those benefits and costs can
explain the observed distribution of worker-owned firms. Section III be-
gins by examining the benefits of worker ownership. It argues that worker
ownership offers a number of important efficiency advantages vis-a-vis in-
vestor ownership-advantages that have often been ignored or under-
emphasized in the existing literature. However, these advantages correlate
poorly with the observed distribution of worker ownership: the types of
industries in which the advantages offered by worker ownership seem
most important are not the industries in which worker ownership is most
common. Section IV surveys the principal costs that have most commonly
been imputed to worker ownership vis-a-vis investor owner-
Legacy, Wall St. J., July 27, 1988, at 23, col. 1; Yugoslavia Moves Toward Major Reforms, Wash.
Post, June 18, 1988, at A17, col. 2.
13. Williamson refers to this gap in existing theory as "the producer cooperative dilemma." 0.
WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 265-68 (1985).
14. The economic argument developed here is briefly outlined, in the context of a general discus-
sion of enterprise ownership, in Hansmann, Ownership of the Finn, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION
267, 291-96 (1988).
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ship-including the costs of raising capital and of risk-bearing-and ar-
gues that these costs, while clearly significant in explaining the observed
distribution of worker ownership, are less important than has commonly
been supposed and, in any case, are insufficient to explain the existing
distribution of worker-owned firms. Sections V through VII focus on
other costs of worker ownership that have previously been overlooked or
underemphasized, namely the costs associated with collective worker gov-
ernance. The accumulated experience with worker ownership, it is ar-
gued, strongly suggests that these governance costs-which involve both
the costs of the decision-making process and the costs of inefficient deci-
sions-are quite high when the workforce exhibits any substantial degree
of heterogeneity. Indeed, it appears that the most important obstacle to
more widespread development of worker-owned firms is not risk-bearing
or the cost of capital, but rather the difficulty of establishing an efficient
collective governance mechanism for a heterogeneous population of work-
ers. Sections VIII and IX proceed to survey, and reject, several competing
explanations for the limited development of worker ownership to date.
Finally, Section X discusses implications of the analysis for policy, includ-
ing ESOPs, codetermination, the new employee cooperative corporation
statutes, and the prohibition on investor-owned law firms.
The main themes developed here have interest well beyond law and
policy concerning worker participation in the control of enterprise. When-
ever ownership is widely shared-as it is in most large firms, whether
they are owned by investors, workers, other suppliers, or consum-
ers-some form of intra-firm political mechanism must be employed to
permit the owners to act collectively. The characteristics of such mecha-
nisms play an important role in determining which classes of individuals
assume ownership of a firm, how the firm is organized internally, and
how it behaves. Consequently, an understanding of politics is essential if
we are to understand the organization of enterprise. Conversely, by study-
ing the organization of enterprise we can gain valuable perspective on the
characteristics of political institutions and on the relative virtues of politics
and markets. The existing literature in political science and industrial or-
ganization has largely neglected these important points. Worker owner-
ship is a particularly fruitful setting in which to begin exploring them.
II. THE EXISTING PATTERN OF WORKER OWNERSHIP
In a free enterprise economy, the market should tend to select for rela-
tively efficient organizational forms. Two forces push in this direction.
First, entrepreneurs and owners have a financial incentive to organize and
reorganize firms in ways that are relatively efficient. Second, competition
in the market will put less efficient organizational forms at a disadvantage
and those forms will consequently have a smaller chance of surviving. In
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the analysis that follows, survivorship will therefore be employed as an
iitportant index of the relative efficiency of alternative organizational
forms and of worker ownership in particular.
To be sure, we should not exaggerate the effectiveness of market selec-
tion. Self-conscious invention and diffusion of new organizational forms
can be a very gradual process; relatively inefficient firms may be weeded
out by market forces only slowly;15 organizational, tax, and regulatory law
may inhibit or promote particular 6rganizational forms in particular sec-
tors without regard to their efficiency; and various cultural and ideological
factors may have a strong influence on the structure of organizations. We
shall return below to consider these limitations on market selection more
carefully and to assess how important they may be in explaining the cur-
rent distribution of worker-owned enterprise. Nevertheless, it is reasona-
ble to believe that market selection works with sufficient power to enable
us to draw useful inferences about the efficiency of worker ownership as
an organizational form by examining the circumstances under which it
thrives and the particular configurations it takes.
It should be emphasized that the concept of "efficiency" is used here in
the broad sense, conventional in economic analysis, to encompass not only
pecuniary but also nonpecuniary interests and values.1" For example, if
participation in the governance of the firm is valuable to workers as an
end in itself, then that preference must be given weight in evaluating the
relative efficiency of alternative organizational forms. In contractual set-
tings, such as the relationship between a firm and its workers, market
selection can generally be expected to take such nonpecuniary values into
account. For example, workers who value participation in governance for
its own sake are presumably prepared to accept lower financial compensa-
tion from a firm that permits such participation than from one that does
not, and thus, ceteris paribus,1 7 the participatory firm will have lower
costs of labor than other types of firms and will be at a competitive advan-
tage in the market for its products or services.
A. The Meaning of "Ownership"
The term "ownership," as it is generally used and as it will be used
here, refers to possession of two rights: the right to control the firm and
the right to appropriate the firm's residual earnings (that is, the net earn-
15. See R. NELSON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
16. In broad terms, an organizational form is efficient only if there is no alternative form that
could potentially make at least one person better off, in terms of her own subjective value system,
without making anyone else worse off. (In general, I shall use the term "efficient" here more nar-
rowly to mean "Kaldor-Hicks optimal." Because of the contractual character of worker-firm relation-
ships, we need not be much concerned with the distributional considerations that distinguish Pareto
optimality from Kaldor-Hicks optimality as definitions of efficiency.)
17. In particular, ignoring any other influence that worker participation might have on the per-
formance of the firm, such as increasing or decreasing productivity.
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ings remaining after all contractually fixed payments have been made).
Control may be exercised either directly, as in the form of direct democ-
racy that characterizes many small partnerships, or indirectly, as in those
large firms in which the workers (like the shareholders in publicly-held
business corporations) simply vote periodically to elect the firm's directors,
to whom most of the important decision-making powers are delegated.
There are many firms in which the workers receive some or even all of
the firm's residual earnings but have no right to participate in control of
the firm. For example, in many firms with ESOPs the workers, through
the ESOP, have a claim on most, or sometimes all, of the firm's net earn-
ings while control over the firm remains in other hands. These firms are
often described as "worker-owned," but this is a bit of a misnomer. In
such firms control is often in the hands of investors of equity capital, who
also receive a share of the firm's residual earnings; firms of this type are
essentially investor-owned firms with incentive compensation schemes. In
other cases, control is in the hands of fiduciaries who do not participate in
residual earnings and who, although not selected by the workers, are
charged with managing the firm on the workers' behalf. Such firms are
best described as being beneficially rather than directly owned by their
workers.
There are also firms in which workers have at least a partial share in
control but do not participate directly in residual earnings. For example,
under German codetermination, workers elect half of a corporation's (su-
pervisory) board of directors and thus, at least formally, participate im-
portantly in control. The workers in these firms, however, are commonly
salaried rather than compensated with a share of net earnings-although
arguably their salaries can be adjusted over time to reflect changes in
profitability.
In seeking to understand the viability of worker-owned enterprise, it is
helpful to study both firms that are fully worker-owned and firms in
which workers share only partially in earnings or control. As an introduc-
tion to such a study, it is useful to begin with a brief overview of the
incidence of worker ownership both in the United States and abroad.
B. The Distribution of Worker-Owned Firms
1. The United States
Taking the American economy as an example, we find that worker-
owned firms are rare in the industrial sector. If we exclude firms that
have adopted ESOPs in recent years (to which we shall return below),
there have been very few industries in which worker-owned industrial
firms have proven themselves viable over the long run. The most conspic-
uous example is the plywood industry, in which a number of worker co-
operatives, situated in the Pacific Northwest, have maintained substantial
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market share since the first cooperative, was formed in the 1920s. 8 As of
1984, there were fourteen such firms, each with between eighty and 350
members, most of which had been in business for more than twenty years.
Together they accounted for more than ten percent of all plywood pro-
duced. '9 But plywood is unique among contemporary manufacturing in-
dustries in having a substantial number of stable worker-owned firms. In
the nineteenth century there were a few hundred worker cooperatives,
whose members were generally skilled artisans, in such craft industries as
barrel making, shoe manufacturing, and shingle weaving. Such firms
largely disappeared early in this century, however.20
In the service sector, in contrast, worker-owned firms are common and
are the dominant mode of organization among firms of service profession-
als. Outside of law, however, worker ownership is not the exclusive mode
of organization in such fields. In advertising, investment banking, and
prepaid group medical practice, for example, investor-owned firms have
large and increasing market shares.2" Worker-owned service firms also
appear occasionally where the workers involved are not professionals. For
example, taxicab companies in large cities are quite frequently worker-
owned,22 and there has long been a group of worker-owned refuse collec-
tion companies in the San Francisco Bay Area. 3
In addition to these instances of full worker ownership, large numbers
of formerly investor-owned business corporations began in the mid-1970s
to adopt ESOPs under which most or all of the firm's employees receive a
portion of their compensation in the form of stock in the firm. Typically
ESOPs are structured as deferred compensation plans in which the em-
ployer deposits stock in a trust fund that holds the stock for the benefit of
the participating employees, often as the reserve for the employees' pen-
sions. By 1986, approximately 4700 companies had adopted such plans.
Roughly twenty-five percent of these plans owned more than twenty-five
percent of the stock in their firms, and something less than two percent
owned all of the stock.' Today roughly 10,000 companies have ESOPs,2 5
18. See generally K. BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES (1967); Greenberg, Pro-
ducer Cooperatives and Democratic Theory: The Case of the Plywood Cooperatives, in WORKER
COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 175.
19. Greenberg, supra note 18, at 175-76.
20. See Jackall & Levin, Historical Perspectives on Worker Cooperatives, in WORKER COOPERA-
TIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 35; Jones, American Producer Cooperatives and Employee-
Owned Finns: A Historical Perspective, in id. at 37.
21. See infra text accompanying note 123-25.
22. "Taxi cooperatives are currently operating in virtually every large American city in which
local authorities permit these organizations to be formed. They are absent only from cities in which
cooperatives are illegal, because local governments have granted monopolies to competing ownership
forms." R. RUSSELL, SHARING OWNERSHIP IN THE WORKPLACE 141 (1985).
23. Id. ch. 3.
24. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK OWNERSHIP 18, 39 (1986).
25. ESOPs: Are They Good For You?, supra note 7, at 118.
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and estimates indicate that the ESOP owns a majority of the stock in
more than 1000 of these companies.2"
2. Other Countries
The pattern of worker ownership seen in the United States is roughly
duplicated in other market economies: The types of industries in which
worker-owned firms are found, and the structures those firms assume, are
remarkably similar everywhere."'
Italy and France, for example, are the two Western European countries
generally regarded as having the largest numbers of successful worker co-
operatives.2" Available estimates (which evidently omit partnerships of
service professionals such as lawyers) indicate that as of 1975 there were
in France over 500 firms organized as worker cooperatives employing a
total of roughly 30,000 persons2 9 while in Italy, as of 1977, there were
around 2700 worker cooperatives employing a total of roughly 147,500
persons.3 0 The average size of these firms is small (in each country about
55 workers) and the median size is much smaller still-perhaps no more
than a dozen workers. 1 In France roughly half of these cooperatives, in
terms of both numbers and aggregate income, are construction companies,
and the fraction represented by construction firms is even higher in It-
aly.32 Many of the cooperatives that are not construction companies are
firms of artisans, such as printers or locksmiths. 3 In the two countries
there are only a handful of manufacturing firms of substantial size organ-
ized as worker cooperatives. 3 ' And in Italy nearly all of the manufactur-
ing firms that are cooperatives were converted relatively recently from
failing investor-owned firms."'
26. See J. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 4 (1988) (estimating that as
of his writing there were approximately 1000 to 1500 companies, with total of one million workers, in
which an ESOP holds at least 51 percent of company's stock).
27. Because a survivorship test can plausibly be employed only in free-enterprise market econo-
mies, the discussion below largely ignores the experience with worker control of enterprise in those
countries-such as the communist countries of Asia and Eastern Europe-in which the state pre-
cludes meaningful choice among organizational forms. In particular, we shall not examine Yugosla-
via's extensive experience with worker-managed enterprise. The themes developed here Aevertheless
provide a useful framework with which to analyze the Yugoslavian experiment.
28. R. OAKESHOi-r, THE CASE FOR WORKERS' CO-OPS 145-46 (1978); Estrin, Jones, & Svejnar,
The Productivity Effects of Worker Participation: Producer Cooperatives in Western Economies, 11
J. COMP. ECON. 40, 45-6 (1987).
29. R. OAKESHOTT, supra, at 123.
30. Id. at 146. Estrin, Jones, & Svejnar, supra note 28, at 45, state that in 1981 there were
"almost 20,000 registered" worker cooperatives in Italy. But this figure is evidently based on official
records which, as Oakeshott explains, appear substantially inflated.
31. R. OAKESHOrTT, supra note 28, at 129, 146.
32. Id. at 124, 146; Zevi, The Performance of Italian Producer Cooperatives, in PARTICIPATORY
AND SELF-MANAGED FIRMS: EVALUATIVE ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE 239, 241 (D. Jones & J. Svejnar
eds. 1982).
33. R. OAKESHOTT, supra note 28, at 129, 150, 157.
34. See id. at 130, 160.
35. Zevi, supra note 32, at 243.
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The most prominent example of successful industrial worker coopera-
tives in a market economy is not found in France or Italy, however, but
rather in the well-established group of closely affiliated worker coopera-
tives at Mondragon, Spain. The Mondragon group has received consider-
able attention in recent years, and its success is regularly cited by advo-
cates of worker ownership as the best evidence that this form of
organization offers a promising alternative to investor ownership.3 ' The
performance of the group has indeed been impressive. From a single small
cooperative established in 1956, the Mondragon system has grown rapidly
to comprise roughly one hundred affiliated firms with a total of approxi-
mately 20,000 worker-members.17 These firms produce a broad range of
goods including home appliances, furniture, heavy machine tools, and ag-
ricultural products. They obviously deserve special attention, and we shall
examine them much more closely below.3 8
Throughout the world, transportation companies are among the types
of firms most often organized as worker cooperatives-and it is generally
the drivers who are the owners. For example, in Sweden worker coopera-
tives account for one hundred percent of all taxicab services and fifty per-
cent of all truck transport services."9 This is in contrast to the Swedish
manufacturing sector where, although cultural conditions in Sweden ap-
pear favorable for cooperativism and consumer cooperatives are com-
mon,40 worker cooperatives account for only one percent of all firms and
presumably a much smaller percentage of output. Indeed, there is only
one Swedish manufacturing industry, fur and leather goods, in which
more than five percent of the firms are worker cooperatives, and even
there they account for only 6.5% of all firms.4' Similarly, in Israel, driv-
ers' cooperatives provide nearly one hundred percent of bus transporta-
tion42 and fifty percent of truck transport,43 while at the same
time-again despite strong cultural and institutional support of cooperati-
vism-worker cooperatives have never become well established in manu-
facturing. In fact, as of 1972 employment in the Israeli bus and truck
transportation cooperatives alone was more than four times that in all
manufacturing cooperatives combined.44 This pattern of driver-owned
36. See, e.g., R. OAKESHOTT, supra note 28, at 108-20.
37. W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE
WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX 3 (1988).
38. Infra Section VI(C).
39. COMMISSION ON THE SWEDISH COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY, THE
CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN SocIm (1979).
40. In 1970 consumer cooperatives accounted for 18% of Swedish retail trade. Id. at 8.
41. B. LEE, PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: THE CASE OF SWEDEN 10 (1988).
42. Moreover, this has been the case in the territory that is now the state of Israel since the
1920's. Over the intervening decades, the various separate bus transport cooperatives have gradually
merged into a single monopoly, Egged. A. DANIEL, LABOR ENTERPRISES IN ISRAEL 235-54 (1976).
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id. at 219-20.
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transportation cooperatives will be extended to airlines if United Air
Lines' 7000 pilots ultimately succeed in their recent efforts to acquire
United by purchasing a controlling interest in its stock,4 thus creating the
largest worker-owned enterprise in the world.46
C. Costs and Benefits
To understand the reasons worker ownership has developed in the pat-
tern just described, and to see more clearly that pattern's salient character-
istics, it helps to survey systematically the costs and benefits that worker
ownership can bring. We begin with the benefits.
III. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF WORKER OWNERSHIP
Compared with the standard investor-owned firm, in which investors
have control and workers transact with the firm simply through market
contracting,47 worker ownership offers a number of potentially important
efficiencies-efficiencies that have commonly been overlooked or underes-
timated in the existing literature. Yet the types of firms in which these
potential efficiencies seem greatest are not the types of firms in which
worker ownership is most common.
A. Monitoring Workers
Because of the difficulty of monitoring individual workers, a degree of
moral hazard (more simply put, shirking) necessarily infects market con-
tracting for all but the simplest types of labor.4 ' The greater the difficulty
of monitoring workers, the worse this problem is likely to be.
45. Originally, United's pilots sought to purchase the airline by themselves. See, e.g., Pilots Renew
Bid to Buy Out Parent Company of United, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 9, 1988, at 95;
United's Pilots Are Inching Closer to a Coup, Bus. WK., Aug. 31, 1987, at 32. That bid collapsed in
October 1989. Since then, the pilots' union has joined with United's machinists' union and flight
attendants' union in another effort to purchase the airline. See 3 Unions Plan Neu, Bid for United
Airlines, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1990, at Dl, col. 3.
46. It is generally acknowledged that the transaction would create the largest employee-owned
firm in the United States. See, e.g., UAL Seen Accepting Buyout Bid, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1989, at
DI, col. 3; 3 Unions Plan New Bid for United Airlines, supra note 45. Outside the U.S., the largest
worker-owned enterprise appears to be the complex of cooperatives at Mondragon, Spain, discussed
infra Section VI(C). The Mondragon cooperatives have in total only a third as many employees as
United, and, although it is hard to obtain current estimates of assets for Mondragon, the value of
those cooperatives is clearly far less than the $6.75 billion that the pilots offered in 1989 to acquire
United. See, e.g., H. THOMAS & C. LOGAN, MONDRAGON: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 96-130 (1982)
(giving statistics on assets and income of Mondragon system as of 1979).
47. That is, simply through individual labor contracts with the firm (perhaps supplemented by a
collective bargaining agreement) under which workers' only leverage over firm policy is the threat to
withdraw their services from the firm and take whatever other alternative the labor market offers.
48. If management cannot determine the difference between a high level of effort and a low one,
workers in an investor-owned firm have an incentive to expend only a low level of effort whatever
their contract calls for. The owners of the firm, in turn, have an incentive to compensate the workers
only for the low level of effort that is to be expected from them. This outcome will result, moreover,
even if both workers and the owners of the firm would prefer an arrangement whereby workers
received greater compensation and expended a higher level of effort. The classic model of this phe-
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Making the workers the owners of the firm may solve this problem to
some degree. As owners, the workers will (at least collectively) bear all of
the costs of their shirking and thus will have an incentive to expend a
level of effort closer to that which is efficient. To be sure, so long as any
substantial number of workers share ownership, each individual worker
will bear only a small fraction of the costs of her own shirking. But each
worker/owner also has an incentive to monitor her fellow workers and to
apply pressure to them not to shirk, an incentive that is largely lacking in
an investor-owned firm. In short, by encouraging both self-monitoring and
mutual monitoring, worker ownership may offer an important efficiency
advantage over investor ownership where monitoring workers is difficult.
Following this logic, it has sometimes been argued-most prominently
in a famous article by Alchian and Demsetz,49 although the argument has
often been repeated since 5 -that worker ownership can be understood
largely as a response to moral hazard in labor contracting and that worker
ownership therefore tends to arise in those situations in which workers are
unusually hard to monitor. Thus, Alchian and Demsetz argue that
"[w]hile it is relatively easy to manage or direct the loading of trucks by a
team of dock workers where input activity is so highly related in an obvi-
ous way to output, it is more difficult to manage and direct a lawyer in
the preparation and presentation of a case.""1 This explains, they claim,
why the partnership form is to be found among lawyers and other groups
of individuals with artistic or professional skills.52
As it is, however, the existing pattern of worker ownership is just the
reverse of what one would expect if it were primarily a response to the
difficulty of monitoring workers. In the service professions, where worker
ownership is the norm, the productivity of individual workers can be, and
generally is, monitored remarkably closely, since the quantity and quality
of each individual's inputs and outputs can be observed with relative ease.
Lawyers in corporate law firms, for example, commonly document the use
of their time in intervals of six or ten minutes, indicating whether and to
which client the time can be billed and the precise nature of the work
done for the client in that interval.53 Such records yield a close measure of
nomenon-though one that focuses on adverse selection rather than moral hazard-is offered in
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON.
488 (1970).
49. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
50. E.g., Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-
Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469 (1979); Russell, Employee Ownership and
Employee Governance, 6 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 217 (1985); Fama & Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 315-17 (1983); Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems
and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 334-6 (1983).
51. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 49, at 786.
52. Id. at 790.
53. McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit Sharing in Law Firms: An Alterna-
tive Hypothesis, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1982), makes a similar argument regarding the Alchian and
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the kind and quantity of work produced by an individual lawyer over the
year, and of the client revenue that this work has yielded the firm. More-
over, it is relatively easy to assess the quality of a lawyer's work over time,
in part because the work product is frequently embodied in written docu-
ments produced by that lawyer alone.
In contrast, investor ownership is the dominant mode of organization in
most firms in which employees commonly work in large teams or have
extensive supervisory or managerial tasks-settings in which an individ-
ual's productivity is extremely difficult to measure. Thus, while it is rela-
tively easy, and in fact a common practice, to compute with relative accu-
racy the marginal contribution to a law firm's net earnings that a given
individual lawyer makes each year, it is inconceivable to think of under-
taking such a calculation for an assistant vice president, or even a shop
foreman, at General Motors.
This is not to say that monitoring can be done perfectly in law firms or
in other firms of service professionals. Nor is it to deny that worker own-
ership improves productivity in such firms by helping to cope with moni-
toring problems. In fact, improved incentives for productivity are probably
a significant reason why worker ownership is so common among these
firms. 4 The point is simply that there must be other factors that are
much more important in determining the distribution of worker owner-
ship, since the types of firms in which worker ownership is most common
seem to be firms in which worker monitoring is relatively easy.
Demsetz monitoring theory. McChesney offers the alternative theory that lawyer ownership of law
firms provides a necessary incentive for senior lawyers to undertake the promotional efforts necessary
to attract business to the firm. "Profit sharing in law firms might be explained as akin to a salesman's
commission in rewarding promotional factors in professional firms." Id. at 390. In essence, however,
this is just a special case of the high-cost-of-monitoring theory. Undoubtedly worker ownership im-
proves incentives for promotion. Yet this factor seems inadequate in itself to explain the prevalence of
worker ownership among law firms as opposed to other types of firms. It is not difficult to determine
which clients were brought to the firm by which lawyers and thus to reward the lawyers simply by
salary for their promotional efforts. Moreover, not all partners play an important role in attracting
business. And finally, there are many other industries in which attracting new clients is a major part
of the job, but the employees responsible for this are not made owners.
54. There is some anecdotal evidence-for example, from the plywood industry-that worker
ownership improves productivity. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 18, at 175-76. Efforts to obtain
explicit empirical measures of the effect of worker ownership on worker productivity have so far been
inconclusive, however. The evidence available to date, taken as a whole, suggests that profit-sharing
alone has a weak positive effect on productivity. M. Weitzman & D. Kruse, Profit Sharing and
Productivity (June 1989) (unpublished manuscript; on file with author). Some studies suggest further
that worker control has a positive effect on productivity beyond that which can be obtained simply
with profit-sharing, although the results are ambiguous and are clouded by the absence of a straight-
forward comparison between worker-controlled and investor-controlled firms. See, e.g., Jones &
Svejnar, Participation, Profit Sharing, Worker Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Coop-
eratives, 52 ECONOMiCA 449 (1985); Jones, British Producer Cooperatives, 1948-1968: Productiv-
ity and Organizational Structure, in PARTICIPATORY AND SELF-MANAGED FIRMS, supra note 32,
at 175.
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B. Worker Lock-In
After an individual has worked for a given firm for a number of years,
his skills often become specialized to that firm. Consequently, he is sub-
stantially more productive there than he would be if he were to work
elsewhere. Moreover, a worker must often make important personal in-
vestments in the community where his employer is located, investments
that cannot be recouped if he leaves that community. His spouse may be
employed there, his children may be accustomed to the local school sys-
tem, and his entire family may have developed strong personal ties with
other members of the community. Consequently, as time passes it often
becomes increasingly costly for an individual to change employers; to a
degree he becomes "locked in" to the firm. In such circumstances, the
individual's value to the firm may substantially exceed his potential return
from employment elsewhere. Such an individual's employer has an incen-
tive to act opportunistically toward him, compensating him only near the
level of his next best alternative and taking the surplus for itself. Workers
who perceive this possibility for exploitation may insist on higher initial
wages, resist making otherwise efficient firm-specific investments, or insist
on extensive job and wage guaranties, thus making labor contracting more
costly.55
Worker ownership reduces the incentive for such opportunism: presum-
ably workers would not generally vote collectively to exploit themselves as
individuals. Consequently, worker-owned firms may have an efficiency
advantage over investor-owned firms where other contractual devices are
inadequate to control such opportunism. 56 Indeed, vertical integration
often arises to deal with lock-in problems in other industrial settings,5"
and worker ownership is a form of vertical integration. This might lead
one to expect worker ownership to arise where the problem of lock-in is
particularly severe.
Yet the distribution of worker-owned firms appears to correlate poorly
with the degree of worker lock-in. While clear data are lacking, it seems a
reasonable inference that, in large industrial and service firms, middle and
upper-level managers (and perhaps many blue-collar employees as well)
often become specialized to their current employer over time and thus con-
55. Sometimes the employer also has a transaction-specific investment in the worker-for exam-
ple, where the worker's accumulated experience on the job makes him much more valuable to the firm
than a new employee would be. In that case, the worker has a countervailing threat to use in bargain-
ing and may not need to fear serious exploitation. Even in this situation, however, there is the possi-
bility that bargaining will be costly, since the parties stand in a relationship of bilateral monopoly.
56. The types of contractual devices that are required are ones that bond the employer not to
behave opportunistically. For example, the employer might supply a hostage of some sort. See, e.g., 0.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 163-205. In labor contracting the employing firm's reputation may
often be the only effective hostage it can supply, and this may sometimes be inadequate-for example,
where there is a possibility of endgame behavior.
57. Id. at 85-130.
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siderably more productive in that firm than they would be in any alterna-
tive employment.58 Nevertheless, such firms are rarely worker-owned.
Conversely, the types of workers found in worker-owned firms appear
unusually mobile. This appears to be true of the types of blue-collar
workers who most commonly form worker cooperatives, such as taxicab
drivers,59 refuse collectors, and the semi-skilled laborers in the plywood
cooperatives. It is arguably true as well for service professionals such as
lawyers and accountants.
To be sure, a professional such as a lawyer will develop a special famil-
iarity with his firm's personnel, procedures, and clients that will be con-
siderably more valuable within that firm than in another firm. Yet, in
part because service professionals typically provide services directly to
their firm's clients rather than providing intermediate services to the firm
itself, such professionals have mobility advantages that other types of em-
ployees lack: Their skills are generally highly transferable; they have the
option-largely lacking for other types of highly skilled individuals-not
only of taking a position with another established firm but also of forming
a new firm of their own; and they can often take some of their clients with
them when they leave their current employer. 60
In short, the types of workers who are found in worker-owned firms
appear, if anything, to be less subject to lock-in than are workers in typi-
cal investor-owned firms. Again, this is not to say that lock-in does not
provide an important incentive for worker ownership. But there must be
other considerations that are more important in determining where
worker ownership is most viable.
C. Strategic Behavior in Bargaining
With investor ownership, management often has information that labor
lacks about the firm's future prospects, including profitability, employ-
ment needs, and plant closings or relocations. Similarly, workers have
knowledge that management lacks concerning the workers' own opportu-
nities and preferences, including the minimum wages they would find ac-
58. This does not necessarily mean that they become much more productive and thus much harder
for their employer to replace. It could equally well result if over time employees lose some of the
general skills and the flexibility for retraining that they had at the beginning of their work careers.
59. Taxicab drivers may, however, experience some degree of lock-in. In many towns taxicab
companies have substantial monopoly power. Thus a taxi driver may be forced to move to another
town if he wishes to seek alternative employment. Such a move will not only cost him whatever
investment he and his family have made in personal relationships in the community, but will also cost
him his accumulated experience with the community's streets and traffic patterns.
60. Gilson and Mnookin note that lawyers who are insufficiently prominent to achieve substantial
individual reputations outside their firms may experience a degree of lock-in owing to the fact that
their present firm has much better information about their productivity than does any prospective new
employer. Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Lau, Finn: The Economics of Associate
Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 576-78 (1989). But even if this were true, it would seem
much easier for a lawyer to demonstrate her competence to a prospective new employer than it would
be for a manager in a large industrial firm.
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ceptable, the ease with which they can increase their productivity, and
changes in workplace organization that will improve productivity but re-
quire fewer employees or greater employee effort. The resulting asymme-
tries in information increase the incentive for both labor and management
to adopt bargaining strategies, such as strikes and lockouts, that signifi-
cantly raise the transaction costs of reaching agreement."' Worker owner-
ship can reduce or eliminate these costs: By merging labor and manage-
ment, it removes their conflict of interest and assures that they share the
same information.62
In the types of firms in which worker ownership is common, however,
the potential asymmetry of information between management and workers
seems relatively low. Consider, for example, partnerships of professionals
such as law firms. The smallness of such firms, together with the shallow-
ness of the hierarchy between management and the firm's professionals
(reflecting the fact that the professionals in these firms in many respects
effectively are the firm's management), suggest that the senior profession-
als in these firms, even if they were not partners, would among themselves
have most information available to management, and vice-versa. It is in
large firms with substantial hierarchy and division of labor between man-
agement and the rest of the labor force that information asymmetries seem
likely to be most pronounced.
D. Communication of Worker Preferences
When workers have information concerning their preferences that they
cannot credibly communicate to management, inefficiencies may arise be-
yond the costs of strategic bargaining behavior. In particular, management
may find it difficult to select the least-cost package of financial compensa-
tion and working conditions that will yield workers a given level of satis-
faction. What, for example, are the workers' preferences concerning trade-
offs between compensation and working conditions? Among different
compensation packages, what is the workers' preferred tradeoff between
current and deferred compensation, or between job security and increased
wage levels? With respect to working conditions, what is the workers'
preferred tradeoff among job safety, workplace aesthetics, speed of pro-
duction, and variety of work? When there is a conflict of interest between
workers and management, as in an investor-owned firm, there may be no
credible way for workers to convey their preferences on these matters even
where both management and workers would be better off if these prefer-
61. For a survey of theoretical models and their fit with empirical data, see Kennan & Wilson,
Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data, J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS
(forthcoming).
62. Elected representatives can, of course, have a conflict of interest with their constituents or have
information that their constituents lack. Consequently, strikes in fact sometimes occur in worker-
owned firms, as at Mondragon in 1974. See infra note 134.
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ences could be conveyed; workers will have an incentive to misrepresent
their preferences and, knowing this, management will disbelieve them.
Joining the interests of management and workers through worker own-
ership can mitigate this problem. Yet this advantage also fails to explain
the existing distribution of worker ownership since, as just noted in the
discussion of strategic bargaining behavior, worker ownership tends to ap-
pear in precisely those settings in which management is likely to have
relatively little difficulty achieving an accurate understanding of workers'
preferences.
E. Responsiveness to Average Versus Marginal Worker Preferences
Even if an investor-owned firm has accurate information about worker
preferences, the firm may choose an inefficient combination of financial
remuneration and working conditions for its workers. A firm that simply
hires workers on the labor market, as an investor-owned firm does, has an
incentive to adjust pay and working conditions to the preferences of the
marginal participant in the market. Yet efficiency requires that the firm
adjust its policies to the preferences of the average worker, and the prefer-
ences of the marginal individual may differ from those of the average
individual. 8
Consider, for example, a firm's choice of the appropriate level of safety
for its workers. The firm has an incentive to choose the least-cost combi-
nation of pay and investment in safety that satisfies the marginal work-
ers-that is, the combination that just suffices to retain those workers who
are most likely to leave the firm and seek employment elsewhere. But the
preferences of the marginal worker-who may, for example, be young,
single, and relatively unconcerned with safety-may not be those of the
average worker. Consequently, the level of workplace safety chosen by the
firm may not be that which most efficiently satisfies the preferences of the
workers as a whole.
Making the workers the owners of the firm might well lead to an effi-
ciency improvement in this respect because, to the extent that the worker-
owners vote to decide such matters, they will tend to choose policies that
reflect the preferences of the median worker. Although the preferences of
the median worker might not be the same as those of the mean, in general
they seem likely to be much closer to the mean than are the preferences of
the worker who is marginal in the market.
Direct evidence of the importance of this problem in investor-owned
firms is difficult to find. Collective bargaining (discussed further below)
presumably mitigates its effects considerably wherever there are unions.
But in any event this problem does not seem to be particularly important
63. See Spence, Monopoly, QualitY, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975).
1990] 1767
The Yale Law Journal
in explaining the distribution of worker-owned firms, since, as discussed
at considerably greater length below, firms in which worker ownership
appears generally have unusually homogeneous work forces. Moreover,
they tend to confine ownership to an especially homogeneous subset of
their workforce. Consequently, differences in preferences between margi-
nal and average workers are probably unusually small among the workers
who share ownership of worker-owned firms.
F. Agency Costs of Delegation to Management
The problem of the separation of ownership and control-or, as it is
characterized in the economics literature today, the agency cost of policing
management 64-is potentially much less acute in worker-owned firms
than it is in investor-owned firms. Investors of capital are often widely
dispersed, have no sources of information about the firm beyond publica-
tions, and hold the firm's securities as only one of a number of invest-
ments. Consequently, they are in a poor position to police the firm's man-
agement. In contrast, a firm's workers have substantial information about
the firm simply as a byproduct of their employment and are in a good
position to learn more; they have a large personal stake in the fortunes of
the firm; and they can be easily assembled for collective action. In short,
they have both the opportunity and the incentive to acquire information
about the effectiveness of management, or to appoint and hold accountable
representatives who will do this for them, and then to act collectively to
make management responsible to their will.
To be sure, investor-owned firms benefit from the market for corporate
control as an aid in policing management. Yet it is not necessary to forgo
the benefits of this market when a firm is worker-owned. Workers can
and generally do retain the right to sell the firm to outside investors65 at
any point they wish."' Such transactions have in fact been relatively com-
mon (for example, among plywood cooperatives,67 advertising firms, and
investment banking firms 6 ).
One might therefore expect to find worker ownership appearing in
64. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
65. A prominent example is the Vermont Asbestos Group, a failing subsidiary of GAF that was
sold to its workers in lieu of closing in 1975 and then, because of a dramatic improvement in its
product market, became highly profitable. In 1978 the workers sold enough of their stock to a local
businessman to enable him to assume control of the firm. M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 2,
at 152-57.
66. To be sure, if all of a firm's equity securities are held by its workers, those securities may no
longer be evaluated and priced by the securities markets. Consequently, the firm will be subject to less
monitoring by those markets than would be the case for a publicly held firm, and the market for
corporate control may be less effective in policing the firm than if it were a publicly held, investor-
owned firm.
67. Greenberg, supra note 18, at 175.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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those circumstances where investors would be in a particularly poor posi-
tion to monitor the firm's management. Yet successful worker-owned
firms are typically sufficiently small so that, if investor-owned, they would
in most cases be closely held firms and thus not subject to particularly
large agency costs resulting from separation of ownership and control.69
Therefore, like the other advantages of worker ownership reviewed above,
this consideration also fails to explain the existing distribution of worker
ownership.
G. Participation
The voluminous literature advocating worker ownership-or, more
broadly, "economic democracy," "worker participation," or "labor man-
agement"-is often vague about the virtues of this alternative form of or-
ganization. Sometimes that literature invokes, with greater or lesser clar-
ity, one or more of the potential advantages of worker control described
above, although usually in rather different language. For example, argu-
ments to the effect that worker control reduces worker "alienation" or
"exploitation" seem to be based at least in part on the possibility that
worker control will prevent the firm from taking opportunistic advantage
of worker lock-in, that it will eliminate strategic behavior in bargaining,
or that it will result in more satisfying working conditions through better
communication of worker preferences.
Sometimes, however, there is a suggestion of further values served by
worker control. In particular, some discussions of workplace democracy
imply that participation in control of the firm through democratic
processes is a value in itself, distinct from any changes in the actual deci-
sions made by the firm as a result. Although the nature or source of this
value is seldom spelled out explicitly,"0 it is possible to speculate on some
potential sources.
First, individual workers might enjoy the process of collective decision-
making as a communal activity that is satisfying in itself quite apart from
the character of the decisions reached. Second, worker control changes the
psychological relationship between the workers and the firm. Market con-
tracting establishes an adversarial relationship between the employee and
the firm: the firm has an incentive to extract from the employee the most
work for the least pay, while the employee has an incentive to seek the
opposite. Workers might feel that having such an adversarial relationship
with their employer is psychologically unpleasant, regardless of whether
69. This is not, however, universally true. For example, some of the advertising firms that have
converted from partnership form to investor ownership in recent decades are now publicly held firms.
70. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 2, at 153 ("self-government in work need not be justified
entirely by its consequences, for, as in the state, it is justified as a matter of right"); cf. S. BOWLES &
H. GINTIS, supra note 2, at 3-4 (stating that they "will not seek to justify" their "commitment" to
democracy as a principle).
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the working conditions and rate of pay established through this relation-
ship are satisfactory in themselves (that is, are at least as good as those
that the workers would establish if they were the owners). With worker
ownership, the conflict of interest between workers and owners that cre-
ates this adversarial relationship is largely eliminated. Third, as is some-
times explicitly argued, individuals gain psychological satisfaction simply
from the sense of being in control, and this may be enhanced by permit-
ting workers to participate in firm decision-making.7' And fourth, as has
also been argued, worker participation in collective decision-making
within the firm may be useful training for participation in democratic
political processes in the larger society and might be valued for this reason
both by the workers themselves and by the rest of society. 2
Again, however, the distribution of ownership types is arguably the re-
verse of what one would expect if such considerations were important.
Worker-owned firms tend to arise in industries in which typical firms
(investor-owned as well as worker-owned) are small and have relatively
homogeneous work forces with little hierarchy, which is precisely the set-
ting in which one would expect worker alienation to be least pronounced.
H. Summary
In summary, worker ownership promises some conspicuous efficiency
advantages over investor ownership, including improved worker produc-
tivity, avoidance of the problems of opportunism associated with worker
lock-in, less strategic behavior in bargaining, better communication of
worker preferences, improved monitoring of management, and the further
satisfactions that may arise from participation in the process of collective
decision-making. These advantages are presumably important in explain-
ing the success of worker ownership in those industries where it is com-
monly found. But the magnitude of the potential efficiency gains from
these sources does not correlate well with the observed pattern of worker
ownership across industries. In general, these potential gains seem greatest
in large-scale hierarchical firms and considerably smaller in the small-
scale service firms where worker ownership is most common. To explain
the existing pattern of worker ownership we must, therefore, examine the
liabilities of worker ownership relative to investor ownership.
71. See Blumberg, Alienation and Participation: Conclusions, in SELF-MANAGEMENT: Eco-
NOMIC LIBERATION OF MAN, supra note 2, at 324.
72. E.g., M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 2, at 126-27; R. DAHL, supra note 2, at
94-98; C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45-66 (1970); J. ROTHSCHILD &
J. WHITT, THE COOPERATIVE WORKPLACE 13 (1986). As Dahl notes, the available empirical evi-
dence fails to confirm the theory that workplace democracy promotes greater participation in demo-
cratic institutions in the larger society.
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IV. SOME BASIC COSTS OF WORKER OWNERSHIP
Worker ownership can, of course, often be a costlier form of organiza-
tion than investor ownership. If this were not so, then the advantages of
worker ownership just surveyed would presumably lead to the complete
dominance of worker-owned over investor-owned firms in all industries.
In this Section we shall survey several potentially costly disadvantages
commonly imputed to worker ownership and offered as explanations for
the relative paucity of worker-owned firms. Most of these disadvantages
are related in some way to capital. Although some of these disadvantages
are real, their significance is frequently exaggerated. While they clearly
help to account for the observed distribution of worker-owned firms, they
also leave much of that distribution unexplained.
A. Raising Capital
An obvious obstacle to worker ownership is the problem of raising capi-
tal. To the extent that the capital needs of a worker-owned firm exceed
the combined liquid wealth of the workers, the required capital must be
borrowed on the market. If the capital is needed to purchase physical as-
sets that can be easily resold for a price close to their purchase price-that
is, to purchase assets that are not "firm-specific"-then borrowing (or
even leasing) on reasonable terms may be quite feasible since the assets
can simply be pledged as security for the funds borrowed. In fact, worker-
owned firms are not uncommon in relatively capital-intensive industries in
which assets are not highly firm-specific. Thus, as we have seen, transpor-
tation companies, much of whose capital is invested in vehicles that are
easily resold, are amonig the types of firms in which worker ownership
most frequently appears. 3 Investment banking also requires substantial
capital per worker, but again the firms' assets are highly fungible.
Family farms provide another illustrative example. In a sense, they are
reductive examples of worker-owned firms in which ownership is confined
to a single individual or family. And they are quite capital-intensive. But
because the land and equipment are not firm-specific and thus provide
good security, individual farmers can borrow extensively to obtain the
capital necessary to permit them to be owners.
On the other hand, where capital is needed to purchase firm-specific
assets it may be very costly or impossible for a worker-owned firm to
obtain the necessary capital by borrowing it on the market. The problem
is that persons who lend capital to such a firm expose themselves to the
threat of opportunistic behavior by the worker-owners, who have an in-
centive to appropriate for themselves the amounts that are borrowed. The
73. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46. A related industry is car rental, in which Avis, the
second largest firm, is employee-owned through an ESOP. With an ESOP, Avis Tries Even Harder,
Bus. Wx., May 15, 1989, at 122.
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workers can accomplish this appropriation either by diverting the firm's
earnings to themselves (for example, through inflated wages) and leaving
too little to pay off the loans or by investing the amounts borrowed in
inefficiently speculative projects whose potential upside gains will accrue
principally to the owners and whose potential downside losses will accrue
principally to the lenders. Without physical assets that can be pledged as
security to the lenders, there may in fact be no feasible way in which the
owners can commit themselves not to behave in such an opportunistic
fashion.
This consideration is probably important in explaining the existing dis-
tribution of worker ownership, which seldom appears without subsidy in
firms, such as those in the industrial sector, that require large amounts of
firm-specific capital per worker. In such firms, ownership by the lenders
of capital is the obvious solution to the problem of opportunism just de-
scribed. 74 On the other hand, the importance of this factor should not be
overstated. 75 The recent success of leveraged buyouts with very high debt/
equity ratios suggests that today debt can be obtained to cover a large
fraction of a firm's capital needs, including firm-specific capital. And the
success of ESOPs in the industrial sector, discussed below, supports the
same conclusion.
Moreover, even if a relatively low intensity of firm-specific capital per
worker is generally necessary for worker ownership to be viable without
subsidy, it is not sufficient. There are many industries in the service sector
that involve low amounts of firm-specific capital but in which worker
ownership has remained rare, such as hotel and restaurant services, retail-
ing, and (at least in the United States) the construction trades. 71
B. Risk-Bea ring
Another commonly cited disadvantage of worker ownership is poor
risk-sharing. And the more capital-intensive the firm, the worse the
problems of risk-sharing will be.
If the workers supply the required capital themselves-for example, by
investing their pension plan assets or other forms of personal wealth in
the firm-they will be badly underdiversified: If the firm goes bankrupt,
they will lose not only their jobs but their savings as well. And if the
workers borrow to finance the firm's capital needs, the resulting leverage
74. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Comnpeti-
live Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
75. For example, Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1226-27 (1984), of-
fers this consideration as the principal reason for the absence of worker cooperatives in the corporate
sector. Although his analysis is sound as far as it goes, as discussed below there are other considera-
tions that seem equally important in explaining the distribution of worker ownership.
76. In Italy and France, as discussed infra Section VI(D), there are a number of construction
companies organized as worker cooperatives.
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will amplify the fluctuations in net earnings going to the workers, leaving
them with highly unpredictable incomes.
Problems of risk-bearing might therefore appear to be a major obstacle
to worker ownership in capital-intensive enterprise even when workers
are able to obtain the necessary capital. Interestingly, however, the ob-
served distribution of worker ownership does not entirely support such a
conclusion. The plywood industry, for example, is both moderately capi-
tal-intensive and relatively volatile, 7 and investment banking is highly
capital-intensive and highly volatile. Family farms provide another illus-
tration. Farming is relatively capital-intensive and also highly volatile. Yet
investor-owned firms have never been able to gain any appreciable market
share in most staple grain crops; farms continue to be owned overwhelm-
ingly by the individuals who work them, despite the large amounts of risk
those individuals must bear.
Moreover, we should not underestimate the amount of risk that work-
ers bear in investor-owned firms. From a risk-bearing perspective, it
would seem that the efficient arrangement would be for the investor-
owners of an industrial firm to bear the overwhelming share of the risk of
the enterprise and insure workers against the vagaries of the market by
providing substantial job security. Yet, in the United States, industrial
workers have traditionally been hired as employees at will who can be
laid off on a day's notice whenever the firm's fortunes take a turn for the
worse-and this has been true even in unionized firms.71 There are pre-
sumably several explanations for this seeming anomaly, including the in-
centives created by the prevailing system of collective bargaining,79 the
reduction in productivity that might accompany greater job security,80 and
the limitation on workers' prospective downside losses resulting from un-
employment insurance, social welfare programs, and the prospect of reem-
ployment. But, whatever the reason, for many workers investor-owned en-
terprise may not offer strikingly less risk than does worker-owned
enterprise.
In short, there is good reason to believe that risk-bearing is not in itself
a major obstacle to worker ownership and that it does not play a strong
role in explaining the distribution of worker ownership that we observe.
77. K. BERMAN, supra note 18, at 33-38.
78. Indeed, "adjustment through layoffs is substantially greater in unionized firms than in compa-
rable nonunionized firms." Medoff, Layoffs and Alternatives under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufac-
luring, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 380, 380 (1979).
79. Seniority systems of job tenure give the elder half of a firm's employees an incentive to sup-
port a union bargaining stance that exchanges high wages for low job security, and thereby to join
with the firm's investor-owners in putting onto the firm's younger workers much of the risk of the
enterprise. See id. at 393-94.
80. Reduction in productivity could result from the reduced incentive for effort on the part of
workers who have substantial job security or from the reduction in efficient reallocation of workers
among firms owing to seniority.
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C. The Horizon Problem
It is sometimes argued that, quite apart from the problems of raising
capital and of risk-bearing just discussed, worker-owned firms are plagued
by a "horizon problem" in that they have too little incentive to invest in
projects that will pay off only over long periods of time. The source of the
problem, it is said, is the workers' lack of transferable residual claims.8"
Since they cannot sell their ownership rights on the capital market at will,
they lack the ability that investor-owners have to realize in the present the
value of the future returns that investments will bring.
There may well be a horizon problem in firms, such as those in Yugo-
slavia, in which workers have control but only a limited right to appropri-
ate net earnings and assets-that is, in firms that are worker-managed but
not worker-owned. In free-enterprise economies, however, most worker-
owned firms with any significant amount of invested capital give their
workers residual claims that are transferable. In some firms these claims
are transferable at all times and in others they are transferable only upon
the worker's ultimate departure from the firm. For example, shares in the
plywood cooperatives can be freely sold to new workers by departing ones,
subject only to a right of first refusal by the firm.82 Even such a right to
sell shares only upon departure should be sufficient to maintain appropri-
ate incentives for investment. Moreover, even if workers could never with-
draw capital from the firm, the workers as a group might be expected to
have a long time horizon for investments since the median worker's ex-
pected length of tenure with the firm may well be as long as fifteen or
twenty years, or even longer if pension payoff periods are included.83 And
a fifteen-year investment horizon is extremely long by contemporary in-
dustrial standards.
D. Reversion to Investor Ownership
It has often been remarked that successful worker-owned firms fre-
quently convert (or, as advocates of worker ownership would have it, "de-
generate") to investor ownership. 4 For example, there has been gradual
attrition from the ranks of the U.S. plywood cooperatives as firms have
81. See Furubotn, The Long-Run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Finn: An Alternative Inter-
pretation, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 104 (1976); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50.
82. Indeed, holders of the shares need not be currently employed at the firm. K. BERMAN, supra
note 18, at 148, 150. But, since dividends are rarely paid on the shares, they are of little value to
anyone who is not an employee. Id. at 150.
83. This assumes that workers generally stay with the same firm for life. But, at least if we
exclude a trial period of a few years at the beginning (during which a worker need not be made a
voting member of the firm), this may be an accurate assumption in many industries.
84. A typical example from the literature advocating worker ownership is J. ROTHSCHILD & J.
WHrr, supra note 72, at 179-81. The most general analytic discussions of the issue are Ben-Ner,
On the Stability of the Cooperative Type of Organization, 8 J. COMP. ECON. 247 (1984), and
Miyazaki, On Success and Dissolution of the Labor-managed Finn in the Capitalist Economy, 92 J.
POL. ECON. 909 (1984).
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been sold to investors by their members. Similarly, failing investor-owned
firms that were bought out by their workers and subsequently succeeded
(rather than going bankrupt) have sometimes reverted to investor owner-
ship.85 And in some of the service professions, such as advertising and
investment banking, many firms formerly organized as partnerships have
been acquired by outside investors in recent years. Noting this pattern,
some scholars have argued that a tendency to convert to investor owner-
ship is an inherent characteristic of worker-owned firms, and that this
tendency is an important reason for the minuscule market share that
worker-owned firms occupy in the industrial sector. At least two different
mechanisms have been offered to explain this supposed tendency.
1. A Tendency Toward Hired Labor
First, it has been argued that when a successful worker-owned firm
takes on additional workers, it has a strong incentive to hire them on a
salaried basis rather than make them owners. For if the firm's net earn-
ings per worker are higher than the market wage rate-which is presum-
ably what is meant when it is said that the firm is "successful"-it will be
more profitable for the existing worker-owners to pay a new worker only
the market wage rather than to give her a pro-rata share in the firm's
profits. Consequently, the ratio of worker-owners to hired workers will
steadily decline until ownership is concentrated in the hands of a small
number of individuals and the enterprise has essentially assumed the char-
acter of a capitalist firm. 86
The logic behind this argument, however, is based on the assumption
that the productivity of a worker in the worker-owned firm is the same
whether she is hired as a salaried employee or made an owner. But in
that case worker ownership has no efficiency advantage over investor
ownership, and there is no reason why the workers should own the
firm.87 The success of the worker-owned firm in question must be due,
85. For example, see the discussion of the Vermont Asbestos Group, supra note 65.
86. The logic offered to support this analysis is as follows: If a given worker-owned firm is more
profitable than the conventional investor-owned firms with which it competes, this is presumably
because the productivity of workers within the worker-owned firm is higher than that of workers in
investor-owned firms. If workers in the investor-owned firms receive a wage equal to their marginal
product in such firms, then that wage-call it w-will be lower than the returns received by the
worker-owners in the worker-owned firm. Thus the worker-owned firm can attract new workers from
the investor-owned firms simply by taking them on as hired labor, not as owners, and by paying them
a wage of w. Since the productivity of workers within the worker-owned firm is higher than w, the
owners of the worker-owned firm can thereby earn a profit for themselves from such hired labor-a
profit that would not be available if the new workers were made members of the firm and allowed to
share equally in profits. Thus the worker-owned firm will expand by hiring new workers rather than
by making them members. See Ben-Ner, supra note 84; Miyazaki, supra note 84.
87. Even where it does not result in greater worker productivity, worker ownership could be more
efficient than investor ownership if workers placed sufficient value simply on participation in govern-
ance, as described supra Section Ill(G). But in that case, the existing worker-owners of a firm would
have little incentive to refuse to make new workers owners, since the new workers would presumably
be willing to work for less as owners than as salaried employees, thus leaving a larger share of
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not to the fact that it is worker-owned, but rather to some other factor
such as long experience in the industry or possession of an important pat-
ent. Consequently, the firm would be just as successful, or perhaps even
more so, if it were investor-owned. Where, on the other hand, the success
of a worker-owned firm is due to the fact that it is worker-owned-say,
because workers in the industry in question are more productive, or are
willing to work for lower cash compensation, when they are owners than
when they are salaried employees-then it should be more profitable for
the existing members of the firm to add new workers by giving them a
share in ownership 8  than by taking them on only as salaried employees,
and there should be no tendency toward investor ownership.
In some industries in which worker ownership is the dominant mode of
organization, there has in fact been no conspicuous tendency to substitute
hired labor for worker-owners. Law firms, for example, almost univer-
sally follow an up-or-out system whereby an employee must leave the
firm if she has not been made a partner within a certain number of years,
thus assuring that all but the most junior lawyers in the firm will always
be owners. Continued adherence to this system arguably reflects a recog-
nition by all involved that worker ownership is the most efficient system
of organization for these firms and that deviation from that system would
in the long run be disadvantageous. To be sure, in recent years there has
been an increasing tendency for law firms to create a class of hired senior
attorneys termed "permanent associates" and thus to abandon strict ad-
herence to the up-or-out system. But, as we shall discuss below,8 9 this
tendency seems best explained by considerations other than the logic of
inevitable degeneration just described.
earnings for the existing owners.
88. If a new worker is brought into an established firm as an owner with a share in future profits
equal to that of the already-existing members, and if the new worker is not required to make a capital
contribution to the firm upon joining, there will be a redistribution of value from the existing mem-
bers to the new one (or at least this will be the case if the firm has accumulated value in such forms as
capital or goodwill). If these were the only terms on which a new member could be added to the firm,
then there would of course be a strong incentive either to add new workers only as salaried employees
or not to expand employment at all, even if workers were more productive as owners than as mere
employees. The solution is either to give new members a smaller share in earnings than their counter-
parts who joined the firm earlier or to require that new members make a capital contribution through
which they effectively purchase a share in the firm's accumulated value from the already-existing
members.
Since the former solution-which may lead to different profit shares for workers who have similar
roles in the firm-may accentuate the governance problems discussed below, it is not surprising that
established worker-owned firms commonly require capital contributions from new members instead.
In some cases these contributions may be a bit disguised. For example, the much larger shares in
profits given older partners in law firms, and the granting of a substantial share in a law firm's
profits to semi-retired older partners, may be a means by which the younger partners effectively
compensate the older partners for the firm's accumulated goodwill.




Another liability often imputed to worker-owned firms is that, if they
are successful, their value becomes so large over time that younger work-
ers cannot afford to purchase a share in the firm from older workers who
are retiring. Consequently, the older workers have a strong incentive to
sell their shares instead to outside investors, thus converting the firm to
investor ownership.
The problem with arguments of this type is that they rarely make clear
precisely why the level of net assets per worker has increased over time.
There are, broadly speaking, two possibilities. On the one hand, it could
be that the technology employed by the firm has not changed since the
workers originally came to own it and that net assets have increased sim-
ply because the firm has retained and accumulated some portion of its
earnings over the years. In that case, it should be possible for the firm to
distribute the accumulated retained earnings to the retiring work-
ers-perhaps by repurchasing from them some or all of their shares in the
firm-and thus reduce the net assets per worker to their original level so
that new young workers can afford to purchase shares in the firm.90 On
the other hand, it could be that net assets per worker have increased be-
cause the firm has adopted new technology that requires more firm-
specific capital per worker than the technology employed when the work-
ers first acquired ownership, and the firm has used its retained earnings
over the years to acquire the required new technology. Consequently, the
requisite amount of equity capital per worker may now be much higher
than a new worker could or would contribute. It would then follow that
because of the change in the capital intensity of the firm, worker owner-
ship is no longer an appropriate form of organization and conversion to
investor ownership would be the most efficient course. 9
In short, financial success need not in itself make it more difficult for a
new generation of workers to become owners of the firm than it was for
previous generations of workers. If there have been no changes in the in-
dustry that. render worker ownership inefficient, then it should be possible
to rearrange the firm's financing-perhaps by increasing the firm's lever-
age-so that new workers can afford to purchase shares and the retiring
generation of workers can realize the earnings accumulated during their
tenure as owners.
90. If the retained earnings have been used to pay off loans taken out when the firm was origi-
nally formed, it may be necessary for the firm to take out new loans to obtain the funds needed to
distribute to the retiring workers-thus in effect levering itself back up to its original level.
91. Note that goodwill is among the common forms of firm-specific capital that a firm might well
accumulate over time.
1990] 1777
The Yale Law Journal
3. Why Are There Conversions to Investor Ownership?
If, as just argued, there is no perverse mechanism that causes successful
worker-owned firms to convert to investor ownership simply as a conse-
quence of their success, then why do conversions from worker ownership
to investor ownership occur so frequently? The most likely explanation is
that worker ownership is not an efficient mode of organization for the
firms involved.
In some firms that convert from worker to investor ownership, worker
ownership was probably an inefficient way to organize the firm from the
start. For example, in some cases worker-owned firms are undoubtedly
established out of miscalculation or excessive idealism; conversion to inves-
tor ownership is then simply a belated recognition of that fact. In other
cases worker ownership, though in itself inefficient for the firm in ques-
tion, is evidently adopted to facilitate a one-time transaction that could not
otherwise be arranged. A common situation of this type is found in failing
plants operated by investor-owned firms. Selling the plant to its workers
offers a way for the workers, and especially their union,92 to accept the
substantial concessions (such as severe reductions in wages, changes in
work rules, and layoffs) necessary for the plant to continue production
without loss of face and with the assurance that the fruits of the conces-
sions will not go disproportionately to the firm's current investor-
owners." The concessions having been made, there remains the option of
selling the firm back into investor ownership if it succeeds.9"
Finally, there are situations in which worker ownership was once effi-
cient but has ceased to be so, perhaps because the character of the indus-
try has changed. This is probably the situation in investment banking, for
example, in which the capital required per worker and the internal com-
plexity of individual firms have increased in recent years to the point
where, for most firms, investor ownership may now be the most efficient
mode of organization.
E. Summary
The efficiency of worker ownership undoubtedly suffers when substan-
tial amounts of capital, particularly firm-specific capital, are required per
worker. Nevertheless, both logic and experience suggest that worker-
owned firms can operate successfully with at least moderately high capital
intensities. Moreover, there are many industries with low capital intensi-
92. The workers' union, in particular, may be concerned that signing a collective bargaining
agreement with large givebacks may create a precedent that will compromise its bargaining posture at
other firms or at other plants of the same firm.
93. See K. BRADLEY & A. GELB, WORKER CAPITALISM: THE NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
35-36 (1983).




ties in which worker ownership has failed to take hold. There must there-
fore be other important costs associated with worker ownership that bear
strongly on its viability. The costs of collective decision-making, to which
we now turn, appear exceptionally important in this regard.
V. THE COSTS OF COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE
We noted above that workers are in many respects well situated to
monitor a firm's management and hold it accountable. If the workers are
to exercise control effectively, however, they must employ some form of
collective choice mechanism-in effect, a political process-to aggregate
their preferences and permit them to make decisions as a group. Most
typically, a voting mechanism of some sort is employed. Small firms may
simply adopt a form of direct democracy in which all the owners vote on
important decisions to be taken by the firm. In larger firms, the apparatus
for collective governance is likely to take the form of a more elaborate
electoral mechanism. The typical model is that which is commonly em-
ployed in publicly held investor-owned corporations, in which the worker-
owners vote directly only on major "constitutional" changes in the firm
while more routine decisions are put in the hands of a representative
body, such as a board of directors, whose members are elected periodically
by the owners. The representative body, in turn, generally employs a vot-
ing process of its own to make decisions. It may also have a more or less
elaborate committee structure, and its decisions are likely to be subject to
judicial review upon suits brought by individual owners.
The burgeoning public choice literature has begun to document, in the
context of governmental institutions, what common sense and casual em-
piricism suggest: that collective choice mechanisms can engender substan-
tial costs. To date, however, the costs associated with collective choice
mechanisms have received little systematic attention in the literature on
industrial organization and in analyses of worker ownership in particu-
lar. 5 Yet it appears that these costs play a critical role in determining
where, and how effectively, worker ownership works.
95. The most significant exception is the analysis by Jensen and Meckling, who have referred to
the problem of collective decision-making in labor-managed firms as "the contro. problem." Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 50, at 488-89, 493-95. Although they do not discuss the issue in detail, they
note the possibility for conflicts of interest among the workers 'in such a firm and suggest that they
may be a substantial source of inefficiency:
However the conflicts are resolved, it would be very surprising, indeed, if they brought the
firm close to Pareto-optimal performance.
Meanwhile, the process is certain to impose costs. Workers will find it in their interest to
organize and engage in various political activities within the firm. When new hires are to be
made, those in control will want to see that the new employees conform to their tastes, or at
least can be induced to vote for their side. They will similarly want to force nonconformist
employees out of the firm.
Id. at 494-95.
The costs of collective decision-making might be considered a particular instance of the "influence
costs" that have been explored in Milgrom, Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient
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A. Sources of the Costs
If all workers had the same preferences concerning all matters of firm
policy, there would presumably be few costs associated with collective de-
cision-making. On many important issues, however, there are likely to be
substantial differences of opinion among a firm's workers. Sometimes
those differences will simply reflect different judgments about the most
effective means for achieving a commonly shared goal. But the most seri-
ous differences are likely to arise where the individuals involved will be
affected differently by whatever decision is taken.
For example, there can obviously be disagreement over the relative
wages paid to different workers. Workers may also have different stakes
in any pattern of investments chosen by the firm, such as which plants to
keep open, which processes to automate, or where to make further im-
provements in safety. The extent to which workers' interests diverge in
these respects is likely to increase as the division of labor within the firm
increases; where all workers do essentially the same job, they will be simi-
larly affected by most decisions and there is likely to be little conflict of
interest among them. But there may also be conflicts of interest among
workers that have other sources besides differences in job assignments. For
instance, the amount of equity capital invested in the firm may differ sub-
stantially among workers. This is likely to occur if, as is common, the
firm's pension fund is the principal vehicle through which the workers
invest in the firm. Older workers, who have disproportionately large
amounts of capital invested, will prefer to have a larger amount of the
firm's earnings attributed to capital (and hence allocated as earnings on
amounts invested in the pension fund) and a smaller amount attributed to
labor (and hence paid out as wages) than will younger workers.
Such potential sources of conflict might not be very troublesome in
practice if there were obvious objective criteria to employ in making the
decisions in question-for example, if wages or return on capital could
simply be keyed to some unambiguous measure of marginal productiv-
ity." But such objective criteria are usually absent or unobservable at rea-
sonable cost. Therefore, in important decisions there is generally consider-
able latitude for judgment and discretion, and hence room for active
disagreement.
Organization Design, 96 J. POL. ECON. 42 (1988); Milgrom & Roberts, An Economic Approach to
Influence Activities in Organizations, 94 AM. J. Soc. S154 (Supp. 1988); Milgrom & Roberts, Bar-
gaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity, in RATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (J. Alt & K. Shepsle eds.) (forthcoming). In effect, the argument
being made here is that the influence costs that a heterogeneous group of workers impose upon a firm
increase significantly when those workers own the firm rather than transact with it simply through
market contracting.
96. "Keyed to" rather than "set equal to" since simply paying all factors their marginal product,
even if feasible, might not succeed in distributing all of a firm's net earnings; there could well be
surplus left over that the firm would still need to divide up somehow.
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The more that participants in a collective choice mechanism disagree,
-the more costly the mechanism is likely to be. Existing theory in political
science and economics does not identify well the sources of the costs in-
volved. Broadly speaking, however, we can say that such costs are of two
types. First, there are the costs of inefficient decisions. Second, there are
the costs of the decision-making process itself.
Inefficient decisions can arise in several ways. With majority voting, for
example, if all participants simply vote their personal preferences, the re-
sult may be seriously inefficient if the median voter's preferences (which
govern in majority voting) differ substantially from those of the mean, or
average, voter (whose preferences should govern if the decision is to be
efficient)." As a consequence, a majority may, intentionally or uninten-
tionally, inefficiently exploit a minority (that is, adopt measures under
which what the majority gains is less than what the minority loses). Or
control over the political process can come into the hands of an unrepre-
sentative minority that inefficiently exploits the majority. This is particu-
larly likely to happen when, as is often the case, some individuals are
better situated to participate effectively in collective decision-making than
others because they have more time, more talent, or more taste for politics.
In any case, whether it is the majority that exploits the minority or vice
versa, the individuals in the dominant group need not exhibit a high de-
gree of venality for the resulting costs to be substantial. It is sufficient
that, as is natural, their own interests simply have more salience for them
than do the interests of others.
The costs of the collective choice process, in turn, may also have several
sources. Even if workers seek in all cases to exercise their collective con-
trol rights as owners without opportunism, and to reach the decisions that
will be most efficient for the workers as a whole, they may need to invest
considerable time and effort in obtaining knowledge about the firm and
about other workers' preferences and in attending the meetings and other
activities necessary to reach and implement effective collective decisions.
Moreover, we know from public choice theory that the possibility of a
voting cycle98 among alternatives increases as preferences among the elec-
torate become more heterogeneous.99 Such cycling may be costly if there
are transaction costs involved in repeatedly altering firm policies. Finally,
if workers seek to behave strategically, then further costs may result from,
for example, seeking to hide or discover information or seeking to make or
break coalitions. There are, to be sure, measures that can be employed to
97. Shepsle & Weingast, Political Solutions to Market Problems, 78 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 417
(1984).
98. In a voting cycle, the electorate's choices become intransitive and hence unstable-for exam-
ple, voting to adopt policy b over policy a and policy c over policy b, but then voting to adopt policy a
in preference to policy c.
99. Set, Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory An Overview and Interpretation, 20 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 511, 532 (1976).
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limit such costs. For example, delegation of authority to committees can
inhibit cycling and can facilitate the vote-trading necessary to mitigate the
median voter problem. But then committees themselves can be the source
of seriously inefficient decisions.1"'
B. Comparison with Investor-Owned Firms
The costs of collective decision-making in worker-owned firms would
not be an important factor in determining whether enterprise is worker-
owned or investor-owned if collective decision-making among the owners
of an investor-owned firm were just as costly. But investor-owned firms
have an important advantage in this regard. This is obvious where the
firm has a single owner. But it is also true where numerous investors
share ownership of a firm. Shareholders in a firm generally have a com-
mon objective: to maximize the net present value of the firm's after-tax
earnings. To be sure, investors may differ in their tax status, risk prefer-
ence, or need for liquidity, and such differences can cause them to have
different views about firm policy. To a substantial degree, however, inves-
tors can avoid conflicts from these sources by sorting themselves among
firms.
The important differences among shareholders in a business corpora-
tion arise when a subgroup of them also has some other relationship to
the firm-such as employee, supplier, customer, bondholder, or majority
shareholder"'0 -that the others lack. Much of corporate law is concerned
with constraining and resolving these conflicts of interest among share-
holders. Yet such conflicts are arguably relatively easy to deal with in
comparison to the conflicts of interest among the workers within a firm.
For example, the worst forms of opportunism in exploiting inside infor-
mation can be largely eliminated by adopting relatively simple rules con-
straining securities trading by insiders. Similarly, serious abuse of minor-
ity shareholders by the majority can be checked in large part by
promulgating straightforward rules requiring pro rata treatment, by pro-
viding appraisal remedies, or by using the market price of the firm's stock
prior to a transaction as a measuring stick for fairness."0 2
The one place where the law has sought to impose constraints on the
treatment of the minority by the majority in collective decisions made by
workers is under the "duty of fair representation" that labor law imposes
100. Weingast & Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like
Finns, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988).
101. A majority shareholder may have interests that differ from those of the minority because she
is in a position to sell control over the firm to somebody else who has one of the other relationships to
the firm mentioned here, such as customer.
102. We are concerned here only with the process by which the owners of the firm make decisions
among themselves, and not with the agency costs of delegation to management discussed supra Section
III(F). As noted there, the latter costs may often be higher for investor-owned firms than for compa-
rable worker-owned firms.
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on unions. In contrast to the corporate law rules just mentioned, this body
* of law has been singularly unsuccessful in generating coherent and effec-
tive constraints on opportunistic behavior by union majorities. In general,
the duty of fair representation has been effectively employed only to bar
overt discrimination based on criteria conventionally considered invidious,
such as race or sex.
1 0 3
VI. EVIDENCE OF GOVERNANCE COSTS
A survey of the types of firms in which worker ownership has suc-
ceeded suggests strongly that the costs associated with collective decision-
making are extremely important in determining where worker ownership
is viable and how it is organized. In fact, these costs go far toward ex-
plaining the large residual in the existing pattern of worker ownership
that remains unexplained by the other costs and benefits of worker owner-
ship surveyed in Sections III and IV above. 0 4
A. W1hich Firms Succeed?
The most striking evidence of the high costs of collective decision-
making can be found in the fact that worker ownership is extremely rare
in firms in which there is any substantial degree of heterogeneity in the
workforce, or at least among those workers who participate in ownership.
Most typically, the workers who share ownership within worker-owned
firms all do roughly similar work and are of essentially equivalent status
within the firm. Rarely do they have substantially different types or levels
of skills, and rarely is there much significant hierarchy among them (that
is, rarely does one worker-owner directly supervise another). This is evi-
dent in the professional service firms, where worker ownership is best es-
tablished. The partners in a law firm, for example, are all lawyers of
roughly equal skill and productivity who work more or less independently
of each other; rarely does one partner have substantial supervisory author-
ity over another. Similarly, the workers in the U.S. plywood cooperatives
are only semi-skilled and unspecialized and commonly rotate over time
through the various jobs in the mill. Consequently, they have little reason
to differ concerning the policies to be adopted by the firm. The manager,
who is the only person in the firm with specialized skills and tasks and
with substantial supervisory responsibilities, is in nearly all firms not a
member of the cooperative but rather hired as a salaried employee.10 5 The
103. See generally Freed, Polsby & Spitzer. Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective
Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1983).
104. The high costs of collective decision-making in the face of heterogeneous interests have been
documented elsewhere as well. For an example, see Libecap & Wiggins, Contractual Responses to
the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 Am. ECON. REV. 87 (1984).
105. Greenberg, supra note 18, at 206.
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driver-owned transportation cooperatives that are so common throughout
the world also fit this mold.
The predominance of this pattern suggests strongly that worker owner-
ship works best when there is minimal opportunity for conflicts of interest
among the worker-owners. Evidently the viability of worker ownership is
severely compromised when the workers who share ownership play di-
verse roles within the firm' 06 and consequently are likely to be affected
differently by important decisions taken by the firm." 7 Conversely,
worker ownership evidently is viable when the workers involved all play a
similar role within the firm, even if in other respects the net benefits from
worker ownership do not appear unusually strong in comparison to situa-
tions in which investor ownership is the rule.' This suggests that, if costs
associated with collective self-governance were not a problem, worker
ownership would be far more widespread than it is.'" 9
106. The discussion in the text emphasizes the importance of homogeneity in the roles played by
the worker-owners within the firm. But similarity in culture and personal values among the worker-
owners is evidently also important in making worker self-governance viable. See J. ROTHSCHILD & J.
WHITr, supra note 72, at 95-100; see also text accompanying note 145 (noting importance of Basque
culture for Mondragon).
107. Internal dissension seems also to have been an important reason why the workers at the
Vermont Asbestos Group ultimately sold control of their firm to an outside investor. See supra note
65. "[Tlhe experience of bickering and inconclusive meetings convinced many of them that a system
with '180 bosses' cannot work." M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 2, at 157.
The conversion of the investment banking partnership of Lehman Brothers to investor ownership
provides another example. See infra text accompanying note 126.
108. One might ask, in particular, what the advantage is to worker ownership in transportation
companies. In many of those firms, including most taxicab cooperatives and presumably many bus
and truck transport cooperatives as well, the workers own the vehicles they individually operate. The
motivation for this is evidently to provide strong incentives for vehicle maintenance and driver effort.
The firm itself, which is largely confined to central sales and dispatching services, therefore requires
little capital and has little need for outside investors. At the same time, because of lock-in or because
the firm has a regional monopoly on the services it provides, the firm may have some power to behave
opportunistically toward its drivers, thus creating an incentive for driver ownership.
Where, on the other hand, the firm itself owns the vehicles and the drivers are salaried, the inher-
ent efficiency advantages to worker ownership are arguably much more modest. United Air Lines,
discussed infra note 109, is an example. There seem to be two principal affirmative incentives for
adopting pilot ownership at United. The first is to take advantage of the tax benefits from ESOP
financing. The second is to provide a flexible structure within which the pilots can make concessions
in their terms of employment to help make the airline more competitive.
109. These considerations provide perspective on the recent efforts to convert United Air Lines to
employee ownership. In September 1989 an agreement was reached whereby a majority of the com-
pany's voting stock would be acquired by its employees through an ESOP. The company was to be
sold, however, not to all of its 60,000 employees but rather only to its 7000 pilots, thus fitting it
within the pattern of driver-owned transportation companies just described. The takeover was actively
opposed by the airlines' flight attendants and, especially, by its 23,000 machinists, thus underlining
the serious divergence of interests among these different groups of employees. Moreover, the new
owners themselves were not an entirely homogeneous class. The pilots were to acquire only 75% of
United's stock. Of the remainder, 15% was to be acquired by British Airways and 10% was to go to a
group of about 30 executives within the company's management. A negotiated allocation of seats on
the board of directors sought to deal with the problem of sharing power: the pilots and the manage-
ment group were each to get three seats, while British Airways was to get one seat. In addition, eight
seats would be occupied by outside directors who would somehow be selected jointly by management
and the pilots. UAL's Board Approves Wolf Bid After Davis Fails to Increase Offer, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 15, 1989, at A3, col. 1. Further, the pilots and British Airways had different ideas about the
proper course for the company to pursue, and there had long been animosity between the pilots and
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B. Structures to Avoid the Costs
Another indication that collective governance can be costly for worker-
owned firms lies in the strong tendency of such firms to adopt rules and
practices that tend to promote homogeneity of interest among the worker-
owners where it might not otherwise exist. For example, the plywood co-
operatives nearly all adhere rigidly to a scheme under which all members
of the firm receive the same rate of pay regardless of task or seniority.
Moreover, the firms explicitly justify this practice as necessary to avoid
excessive dissension among the members." 0
Even more striking, many of America's largest and most prosperous
law firms have long followed a practice of sharing the partnership's earn-
ings equally among all partners of a given age, regardless of individual
productivity. This is an astonishing fact. As we have seen, law firms not
only can, but do, monitor the productivity of their individual lawyers
quite closely. It would therefore seem natural to adjust each partner's re-
turn to reflect her productivity, and thus provide a strong financial incen-
tive for efficient performance. Yet the equal-sharing firms abandon all
such financial incentives. Obviously there must be some strong counter-
vailing value served by equality in distribution of earnings.
Gilson and Mnookin"' seek to explain this practice as a mechanism for
risk-sharing. Yet, while this may be among the functions the practice
serves, it seems extremely implausible that risk-sharing is the principal
motivation for it. At the time they enter into the equal sharing scheme, the
lawyers involved have already achieved great prosperity and security.
They have proven their professional competence and have become part-
ners, with effective lifetime tenure, in an established law firm. Commonly
their expected earnings are many hundreds of thousands of dollars per
year. Could such individuals nevertheless be so risk averse that they are
the company's management. Can UAL Pilots Bury Their Old Animosities as Finn's Co-Owners?,
Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 1. These differences among the owners might well have made
shared governance of the airline difficult in the long run.
The machinists' and flight attendants' unions have been included in a new coalition recently assem-
bled by the pilots to renew their takeover bid, see supra note 45, hence rendering the coalftion poten-
tially even more unstable than the first one. In an effort to control dissension, the participating unions
are giving no-strike agreements lasting five or six years. Interview with Frederick Dubinsky, chair-
man of United Air Lines branch of the Air Line Pilots' Association, in New Haven (Feb. 7, 1990).
Whether such a coalition will be viable remains to be seen.
At one point the employees of People Express, a U.S. air carrier that flourished between 1980 and
1986, collectively held roughly one-third of the stock of that firm. At People Express, stock ownership
was extended to all employees, not just pilots. This may help explain why, despite substantial em-
ployee participation in decision-making at lower levels, control of the board of directors and of overall
company policy remained in the hands of top management and outside investors. The board evidently
never had members who were non-managerial employees, and the employees seem never to have
participated actively in selecting representatives to the board. Telephone interviews with Melrose
Dawsey, former Managing Officer, People Express (June 21 & July 26, 1989).
110. K. BERMAN, supra note 18, at 151-56; Greenberg, supra note 18, at 178.
111. Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firn and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 320 (1985).
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prepared to relieve their partners of all financial incentives for productiv-
ity simply to assure that their own income will always be the same as that
of the other partners their age?112
This is improbable. Rather, it seems likely that these equal-sharing
schemes are adopted in important part to reduce the costs of collective
decision-making. An equal-sharing rule provides a simple focal point'
1 3
for deciding how to divide the pie. Law firms that do not adopt equal-
sharing rules commonly employ formulas under which a partner's share is
determined according to specified indicia of productivity, such as hours
billed or number and value of new clients brought to the firm. Such for-
mulas-as opposed to less formal approaches under which a manager or
committee is simply given discretion to set relative shares as seems appro-
priate without being bound to a rigid formula-are evidently an alterna-
tive effort to establish more or less objective, and hence uncontroversial,
criteria for dividing the pie where equal sharing is too difficult to jus-
tify.114 Even so, there is considerable dissension within firms about the
structure of these formulas, and the resulting disagreements are an impor-
tant source of instability and dissolution among law partnerships.
Indeed, in general, worker ownership seems to thrive only where, if
equal sharing is not practicable, individual worker productivities are suffi-
ciently easy to measure so that some relatively objective, and hence uncon-
troversial, method of pay that is based on that measure can be employed.
Thus we find worker cooperatives among taxi drivers and refuse collection
crews, where members of the cooperative bill clients individually and can
simply be compensated with a fraction of those billings, while worker co-
operatives are correspondingly rare among those firms-which constitute
the overwhelming bulk of all large firms today-in which production re-
quires the joint effort of large numbers of workers with different skills
performing different tasks, so that the productivity of individual workers
is quite difficult to assess with any precision.
Worker-owned firms also commonly strive hard to assure that not only
112. This inference is reinforced by the tendency of lawyers to gather in firms in which they
share the same specialty and have similar clients-as in firms of patent lawyers, labor lawyers, and so
on. If lawyers were highly risk averse, one would expect to see a much stronger tendency toward firms
that are highly diversified in terms of both specialties and clients.
113. That is, a decision criterion that is so conspicuous or conventional that, though arbitrary, it
serves as a natural point of agreement. See T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLIC-T 57-59
(1980).
114. Gilson and Mnookin observe that all productivity formulas are necessarily imperfect and
thus create incentives for suboptimization by the lawyers at the expense of the firm as a whole. Gilson
& Mnookin, supra note 111, at 352. And this, they suggest, adds to the attractiveness of equal shar-
ing rules. This is surely true so far as it goes, but it gives emphasis to the question-not explicitly
addressed by Gilson and Mnookin-of why it is that firms do not adopt the third alternative men-
tioned here of permitting earnings to be adjusted to each partner's productivity, but in a discretionary
fashion that does not involve a precise formula that can be gamed. A plausible answer to this question
is that the exercise of such substantial power by an individual or small group tends to give rise to
time-consuming and divisive political activity within the firm. An example is provided by the invest-
ment banking partnership of Lehman Brothers, discussed infra text accompanying note 126.
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pay, but also amount and even type of work, is equalized among the
members of the firm. The worker-owners in the plywood factories, as al-
ready noted, commonly rotate through the different jobs over time, so that
there is little long-run specialization of work among them. Law firms
strongly resist admitting to the partnership any lawyer who is not of
roughly the same competence and productivity as the other partners; less
qualified lawyers, if valuable to the firm, are kept on as permanent sala-
ried associates rather than as partners who simply receive a smaller share
of earnings.1 1
5
Similarly, law firms strongly resist letting some partners work fewer
hours than average in exchange for a smaller share. The recent rapid
increase in the number of women lawyers, for example, has created con-
siderable pressure for part-time work arrangements to permit time for
child-rearing. Many law firms now willingly accept such arrangements
for young salaried associates, but refuse to permit women to be partners
on a part-time basis.116 This refusal is sometimes explained on the ground
that clients demand that attorneys be available full time or that attorneys
must practice full time to keep up their skills.11 But these explanations
seem forced. Rather, it appears likely that such inequalities among mem-
bers of the firm are also resisted at least in part because they tend to
destabilize the cooperative governance structure." 8 A simple rule under
which everyone does essentially the same amount and, kind of work, and
receives the same pay, is by far the easiest to agree upon and to enforce, 9
and these advantages are evidently often sufficient to outweigh the costs
115. Members of university faculties, which are worker-governed enterprises of a sort, are famil-
iar with similar phenomena. There is, for example, a strong tendency to equalize teaching loads
within a given faculty, as to both number and nature of courses, regardless of the relative productivi-
ties of different individuals as teachers and scholars. Individuals, such as clinical faculty at profes-
sional schools, who must for curricular reasons be assigned a different mix of teaching responsibilities,
may be given tenure but are generally denied voting rights. See Hazard, Curriculum Structure and
Faculty Structure, 35 J. LEGAL EDuC. 326, 331-32 (1985).
116. This is true, moreover, of some of the firms that hold themselves out as being among the
most progressive in their flexibility in permitting associates to work part-time. See, e.g., Testimony of
Antonia Grumbach of New York's Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler before the A.B.A. Commission
on Women in the Profession (Feb. 6-7, 1988).
117. Sorenson, Life Beyond the Law Office, 70 A.B.A. J. 68 (July 1984).
118. In this vein, it is interesting to note that Aoki has suggested that a "preference for a rela-
tively homogeneous labor force" on the part of management may be among the most important rea-
sons why leading Japanese firms such as Toyota have chosen a low level of vertical integration with
their suppliers. Aoki, Aspects of the Japanese Firm, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE
FIRM 28 (M. Aoki ed. 1984).
119. How does a firm determine, for example, how much and what kind of work is required to
earn 60% of the amount a full-time partner would receive? Simply billing 60% as many hours to
clients as the average full-time partner might be thought insufficient. For example, the firm may
incur fixed costs, such as health insurance or office space and equipment, that do not vary with a
partner's billable hours. Or for most partners, the first 60% of the hours worked in a given week may
be the easy ones to give up, while it is the other 40%, which often require working evenings and
weekends and adjusting one's personal life, that are most begrudged and thus should be compensated
at the highest marginal rate. So, to receive a 60% draw, one should perhaps be required to bill
75%-or 65%, or 85%-of the hours that a full-time partner bills. Objective criteria for making such
a decision are likely to be lacking, and any choice therefore could well be contentious.
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such a simple rule engenders in the form of inflexibility, poor incentives,
and lack of diversification among the workforce. (This is not to deny that
when it comes to denying partnerships to women under conditions accept-
able to them, simple sexism may also play a role.)
To be sure, it is possible that such egalitarian practices are unusually
common in worker-owned firms at least in part for other reasons. In par-
ticular, it may be that causation runs the other way from that suggested
here: Worker-owned firms may be unusually inclined to adopt egalitarian
practices simply by virtue of the fact that they are worker-owned, and not
because such practices are necessary to reduce governance costs. For ex-
ample, there is evidence that a worker at a given firm tends to judge the
adequacy of his salary in considerable part in relation to the amount paid
other workers at the same firm. Consequently, he will accept a lower
wage so long as he is among the best paid, and will require a larger wage
if he is among the lowest paid. The result is that the wage structure
within a given firm is less dispersed than differences in productivity
among workers would predict; the workers at the top of the wage scale
compensate the workers at the bottom, as it were, for the privilege of be-
ing on top.' It is possible that when workers at a firm share ownership
of the firm rather than being simply salaried employees, this effect is in-
tensified-that is, the workers are then even more inclined to consider
themselves as a collective reference group for purposes of judging their
individual welfare. If so, this would lead worker-owned firms to have less
differentiated wage structures than similar investor-owned firms. 2' Such
a phenomenon would not, however, explain why it is that worker owner-
ship tends to arise only where the workers involved are highly homogene-
ous to begin with.
In recent years, the size of corporate law firms has increased dramati-
cally. Firms are now highly departmentalized, and the size of teams that
work on major projects has also become large. Consequently, there is now
substantial horizontal and vertical division of labor within firms. Under
such circumstances, norms requiring equal contributions from all senior
attorneys become harder to maintain, and equal sharing of earnings be-
comes harder to justify. These developments presumably help explain the
increasing tendency among law firms to hire "permanent associates" who
remain with the firm indefinitely as salaried employees rather than as
120. Frank, Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 549, 549 (1984).
121. The same tendency to judge one's wages in relation to one's co-workers can also lead to an
inefficient rat race as each worker seeks to advance relative to the others, with the result that they all
work harder while their relative status in the firm remains unchanged. See R. FRANK, CHOOSING
THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QuEsT FOR STATUS 132-53 (1985). Where all
workers are paid the same, however, there is no incentive for such a rat race. Consequently, if sharing
ownership significantly increases the tendency to judge one's welfare in relation to that of one's fellow
workers, then rules of equal pay should be more common among worker-owned firms than among
investor-owned firms.
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partners. By this device, ownership of the firm can be confined to a rela-
tively homogeneous class of attorneys without cramping the firm's growth
or diversification. For similar reasons it seems predictable that law firms
might seek to accommodate as permanent associates rather than as part-
ners the increasing numbers of senior women attorneys who wish to work
only part time, although laws and norms concerning sex discrimination
may inhibit firms from pursuing this approach.
The ultimate means for a service firm to avoid the governance costs
associated with worker ownership, however, is to convert to investor own-
ership. And this is, in fact, the path being followed in many of the service
professions. Advertising firms began converting from the partnership form
to investor ownership in the early 1960s, and most of the larger firms are
now investor-owned.122 Similarly, investment banking began abandoning
the partnership form in the 1970s, and most of the larger firms there, too,
are now investor-owned. 123 Medical practice has been following the same
route; today there are large numbers of investor-owned health mainte-
nance organizations. 24
Evidently one reason such firms convert to investor ownership is to at-
tract larger amounts of capital than can conveniently be supplied by the
professionals who work for them. 25 But there is evidence, too, that the
conversions serve to alleviate governance problems. Firms in these indus-
tries have been growing larger and more complex, offering a broader
range of services, and exhibiting more internal specialization and depart-
mentalization. Presumably consensus among the professionals within these
firms concerning policies to be followed and division of the firm's earnings
has consequently become increasingly difficult to secure. Striking evidence
of this appears in the well documented sale of Lehman Brothers, one of
the nation's oldest investment banking partnerships, to American Express
in 1984. Although a need for capital seems to have played a role there, the
122. See Bart, Advertising: Debate Rages on "Going Public," N.Y. Times, May 11, 1962, at 40,
col. 2; Lawrence, On Going Public, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1970, § 3, at 13, col. 1; Lipman, Young &
Rublcam Operations in U.S. to be Partnership, Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1988, at B6, col. 4; Rothenberg,
Public Shop or Private, What's Best?, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1989, at D23, col. 3.
123. For example, even by 1979 only 12 of the 40 largest investment banking firms (in terms of
capital) were organized as partnerships. (Figures compiled from SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIA-
TION, SECURITIES INDUSTRY YEARBOOK (1980).)
124. Although early HMOs were predominantly nonprofit, the recent trend has been strongly
toward the for-profit form. As of March 1988, 47.6% of HMOs were for-profit rather than nonprofit,
and 82.6% of plans less than two years old were for-profit. Interstudy, The Interstudy Edge: Quar-
terl) Report of HMO Growth and Enrollment as of March 31, 1988 1 (1988). There appear to be
no accurate data on the percentage of for-profit HMOs that are investor-owned rather than doctor-
owned. Investor-owned HMOs are, however, common. For example, Prudential Insurance Company
operates a chain of more than 100 HMOs nationwide, many of which are directly owned by Pruden-
tial. Telephone interview with Kathy Nelson, Prudential Insurance Plan Reviewer (March 22, 1989).
Moreover, it appears that the need to obtain capital for expansion is one reason that increasing num-
bers of HMOs are adopting the for-profit form. Richards, Exit the White Coat, Enter the Pinstriped
Suit, 292 BRIT. IED. J. 539, 540 (1986).
125. See supra Section IV(A).
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sale was precipitated by a breakdown in internal governance that had its
roots in conflicts between the old-line bankers and the newly powerful
traders within the firm.126
Further evidence comes from the recent emergence of a number of
"boutique" investment banking firms organized as partnerships. 27 These
firms have only a small number of partners and concentrate on only a
portion of the investment banking business, such as mergers and acquisi-
tions. Yet they frequently have large amounts of capital per partner, 28
suggesting that the need for capital is not a decisive factor in the growth of
investor ownership and that governance problems also play an important
role.
C. Representative Versus Participatory Democracy: The Case of
Mondragon
The firms in which worker ownership is commonly found are, like law
firms, typically small enough to permit the employment of highly par-
ticipatory forms of direct democracy. As we noted earlier, however, if
worker ownership is to be established in a firm with a large workforce,
then worker control must presumably be exercised through a representa-
tive rather than a highly participatory form of democracy. 129 The most
obvious model is one, analogous to that employed in widely held investor-
owned corporations and in other types of large cooperatives,'" under
which the workers elect representatives to a board of directors which in
turn is responsible for appointing and overseeing the firm's managers.
One might speculate that, where the workforce is heterogeneous, indirect
representation of this sort could have an advantage over more direct forms
of democracy in securing professional management and avoiding high pro-
cess costs or inefficiently biased decisions. On the other hand, such a sys-
tem of indirect representation might insulate management so well as to
effectively disempower workers-that is, increase the agency costs of dele-
gation to management-and thus sacrifice some of the potential advan-
tages of worker control.
A system of representative rather than direct democracy is in fact the
approach taken in the affiliated group of worker cooperatives at Mon-
dragon, Spain. Because of the substantial degree of success these firms
have achieved (by a variety of measures their average productivity has
126. See K. AULETTA, GREED AND GLORY ON WALL STREET (1986).
127. See Brains Versus Brawn, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 156-58, 161-62 (May 1988).
128. Id. at 162.
129. See Putterman, On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor, 22 EcON. IN-
QUIRY 171 (1984); Russell, Employee Ownership and Internal Governance, 6 J. EcoN. BEHAV. &
ORG. 217 (1985); Williamson, Employee Ownership and Internal Governance: A Perspective, 6 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 243 (1985).
130. Experience with other types of cooperatives is discussed infra Section VI(E).
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regularly exceeded that of Spanish industry in general1" 1), and because of
the extraordinary amount of attention they have received among advocates
of worker ownership, they call for close consideration.
The industries in which the Mondragon firms are engaged are moder-
ately capital-intensive. Nevertheless, the firms evidently have not, over the
long run, had difficulty obtaining the necessary capital. 3 Thus the expe-
rience at Mondragon provides further evidence that capital accumulation
and risk-bearing are not in themselves insuperable obstacles to worker
ownership in a broad range of industries.
It is arguable, however, that the success of the Mondragon system is
dependent upon a variety of constraints that the system imposes on the
scope of worker control. In an individual firm within the Mondragon
group, direct worker participation in governance is largely confined to an-
nual meetings at which the workers elect representatives, in at-large elec-
tions, to a nine-member supervisory board of directors for staggered terms
of four years. The board, in turn, is responsible for appointing the firm's
managers, who serve for a minimum of four years and cannot be removed
during that term except for cause.133 Not surprisingly, the firms have a
strongly managerial character. It appears that leadership comes largely
from the top, and for the most part the electoral mechanisms are employed
simply to ratify proposals made by management." 4 In fact, in apparent
recognition that the electoral mechanisms provide at best a highly attenu-
ated means for workers to influence management, each firm has a "social
council" that is elected by the workers separately from the election of the
firm's board of directors and that serves as the principal avenue by which
the interests of the workers in a firm are made known to management. In
contrast to the members of the board of directors, who are elected at large,
the members of the social council are elected by local constituencies within
the firm. The social council, however, merely acts in an advisory capacity
to management and has no formal authority. Such a social council could
as well exist in an investor-owned firm, and in fact its role parallels that
of works councils or unions in investor-owned firms. 35
Perhaps more important than these procedural limitations on worker
governance are the substantive limitations that the Mondragon sysfem im-
131. H. THOMAS & C. LOGAN, supra note 46, at 96-130.
132. Id. at 125-26.
133. R. OAKESHOTr, supra note 28, at 188; H. THOMAS & C. LOGAN, supra note 46, at 25-29;
W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, supra note 37, at 35-38.
134. This is reflected, for example, in the experience surrounding the 1974 strike at Ulgor, the
largest of the Mondragon cooperatives. The changes in firm policies that precipitated the strike, the
(quite severe) response of the firm to the strikers, and the reforms in the social council undertaken
after the strike all seem to have been undertaken by the firm's management acting largely on its own
and not under the direct influence of the firm's rank and file. See W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, supra
note 37, at 91-107; see also id. at 113-27 (describing introduction of more participative forms of
shop-floor work organization as being introduced by management).
135. W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, supra note 37, at 40.
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poses on the decisions that the workers can make. The workers in an
individual firm are narrowly constrained in the extent to which, and the
ways in which, they can appropriate the firm's net earnings. They are not
free to set their wages at any level they wish; rather, each firm must adopt
a system of wages that deviates only within narrow bounds from a scale
established by the Mondragon system's central bank.13 Ten percent of
the net earnings remaining after payment of these wages must be devoted
to educational, cultural, or charitable purposes;13 7 the rest must be re-
tained and invested in capital accounts. At least twenty percent of net
earnings must be put in a collective account that cannot be appropriated
by the firm's workers, even upon retirement from the firm, and this per-
centage increases according to a formula as the firm becomes more profit-
able. The remaining profits-no more than seventy percent of total prof-
its-are invested in accounts for the individual workers. The amounts in
these accounts cannot be withdrawn before retirement but earn interest
(which is paid to the workers annually in cash) at six percent. These
financial arrangements are imposed on the individual cooperatives by a
"contract of association" that they enter into, at the time of their forma-
tion, with the Mondragon system's central bank; they are apparently not
subject to alteration by a cooperative's workers or management.' 38
The managerial character of the Mondragon firms, as well as the atten-
uation of the workers' property rights in the individual cooperatives, is
accentuated by other features of the system. Individual cooperatives that
are engaged in a given type of production-consumer goods manufactur-
ing, for example, or furniture making, or agricultural production-are
federated into a larger organization whose leadership is effectively ap-
pointed by the managers of the constituent cooperatives. These higher
level organizations often have considerable authority over their member
firms. In particular, there is substantial pooling of profits among the firms
within a given group, so that profitable firms underwrite the losses of
unprofitable ones. Similarly, individual workers can be reassigned from
one firm to another within the group.
In addition, each individual cooperative must affiliate itself with the
136. Id. at 71. In light of the observations above about the tendency of worker-owned firms to
adopt equal-sharing rules, it is interesting to note that although the Mondragon cooperatives have not
adopted equal wages as the norm, they have until recently deliberately kept the spread between the
highest and lowest wages in the firm compressed to a three-to-one ratio. Workers toward the bottom
of the wage scale receive wages roughly equal to those prevailing in the local economy; it is therefore
on skilled employees, and particularly managers, that the compressed wage binds. To retain manag-
ers, the wage spread has recently been increased to 4.5 to 1, with consequences that are not yet clear.
Id. at 45. These constraints on the wage spread apply only to workers who are members of the
cooperative, however. Firms are free to employ up to 10% of their workers simply as hired employees
who are not members, and this authority is used to hire skilled employees who must be paid a wage
higher than that which can be paid members. Id. at 203.
137. This is in fact a requirement that Spanish law imposes on all cooperatives; it did not origi-
nate within Mondragon. Id. at 42.
138. Id. at 69-71; H. THOMAS & C. LOGAN, supra note 46, at 149-58.
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system's central bank, which also exercises substantial influence over the
individual firms. The bank's wage-setting authority has already been
mentioned. Each firm must also obtain whatever additional capital it
needs from the bank and must invest any capital surplus with the bank.139
Moreover, the bank retains and exercises the authority to replace by itself
an individual cooperative's management, or to take over the firm's opera-
tions directly, in case of poor performance. 140 The bank, whose own board
of directors is dominated by the managers of the constituent cooperatives,
is itself evidently a highly managerial institution; as of 1987, the two indi-
viduals who had long served as chairman of the bank's board of directors
and as its chief executive officer were both among the five persons who
had founded the Mondragon group more than thirty years before, and the
chairman of the bank's board was also chairman of the board of the larg-
est individual firm in the Mondragon system and of the federated group to
which that firm belongs.
141
In short, workers' rights to control and to participation in earnings are
substantially attenuated, and the individual firms cannot really be said to
be fully owned by their workers. Rather, the Mondragon system has
something of the character of a large nonprofit holding company that dele-
gates to the employees of each subsidiary the right to elect the subsidiary's
management. More particularly, Mondragon bears some resemblance to a
private university, such as Harvard, whose constituent schools and depart-
ments have substantial budgetary autonomy and are largely self-governing
but are subject to the right of the central administration to intervene when
it feels necessary.
The institutions established within Mondragon therefore suggest some
distrust of power exercised by workers through mechanisms of collective
decision-making. Moreover, in the Mondragon system a conscious deci-
sion has been made to keep each individual cooperative relatively small,
preferably with fewer than 500 workers. That decision was made follow-
ing an eight-day strike in 1974 at the oldest and largest of the coopera-
tives, which then had 3500 workers (and which has since been partially
broken up). In larger cooperatives, it was evidently concluded, workers
and managers become too remote from each other, and important advan-
tages of the cooperative form are lost.1
42
Thus, Mondragon does not provide clear evidence that full ownership
of a large firm with a heterogeneous labor force can be successfully placed
in the hands of its workers. Indeed, the Mondragon experience is consis-
139. W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, supra note 37, at 69.
140. Id. at 75. During 1983, for example, the bank intervened in the affairs of the constituent
cooperatives on 34 occasions. In the process, it replaced two chief executive officers, the chairpersons
of three boards of directors, and six department managers. Id. at 172.
141. Id. at 68-69.
142. R. OAKESHOrT, supra note 28, at 205; H. THOMAS & C. LOGAN, supra note 46, at 35, 92.
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tent with the general pattern that we have already observed: Successful
cases of full worker ownership (as opposed to the attenuated form of
worker ownership found at Mondragon) remain largely confined to small
firms in which a highly participatory form of democracy is feasible, and in
which the members are highly homogeneous. 143 More particularly, al-
though there is clearly a strong element of real worker democracy at
Mondragon, the experience there does not provide clear evidence that,
with a representative form of democracy, the costs of collective decision-
making can be made acceptable for worker-owned firms with a heteroge-
neous work force.
On the other hand, Mondragon provides evidence that an attenuated
form of worker ownership, in which the firm is operated on behalf of its
workers though not fully owned by them, can sometimes be successful in
industrial enterprise. The precise strength of this evidence remains un-
clear. It has not yet been demonstrated how easily the Mondragon experi-
ence can be replicated, and there are reasons to be cautious in concluding
that replication will often be feasible.14 4 Among these reasons are the eth-
nic homogeneity, insularity, and low mobility of the Basque population
from which the Mondragon system draws its workforce."' To date, in
any event, Mondragon remains unique: It has not spawned successful imi-
tators on a similar scale either in Spain or elsewhere.
D. Other European Experience
Mondragon aside, the characteristics of worker cooperatives throughout
Europe follow a consistent pattern that tends to confirm the conclusions
suggested above concerning the efficiency of worker ownership.
Among European countries, as we have noted, Italy and France appar-
ently have the highest concentrations of successful worker cooperatives. 4
Italy subsidizes worker cooperatives in general through tax exemptions
and special credits, 47 which presumably helps account for Italy's unusu-
ally large population of worker cooperatives. Moreover, both France and
Italy grant construction cooperatives special advantages in bidding for
government business, which may be important in explaining the high con-
centration of cooperatives in that industry. 14 8 In any event, the construc-
tion companies and artisanal firms that constitute the bulk of the worker
143. Even in the few worker-owned firms that are moderately large, such as the major accounting
firms with thousands of partners, there is generally a high degree of homogeneity among the worker-
owners. Moreover, among these firms, as at Mondragon, there is a high degree of federation, with
local branch offices being run relatively autonomously.
144. One important test, perhaps, will be whether leadership of the Mondragon system can be
passed on successfully from its founders to the next generation.
145. See W. WHYTE & K. WHYTE, supra note 37, at 9-12, 255-56.
146. R. OAKESHOTr, supra note 28, at 146.
147. Id. at 146, 154, 160, 162.
148. Id. at 124, 126, 150.
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cooperatives in these countries roughly conform to the type of firm in
which worker ownership has proven viable elsewhere: They involve low
amounts of capital per worker and tend to have relatively little hierarchy,
consisting in large part of a single horizontal stratum of similarly skilled
workers. 1
49
The Italian worker cooperatives are all affiliated with one of three as-
sociations, each of which is connected with one of the nation's political
parties. In particular, well over half of the cooperatives, including most of
the largest and most successful firms, are members of an association (the
"Lega") affiliated with the Italian Communist Party. Although the facts
are unclear, there is reason to believe that these cooperatives are neither
very independent nor very democratic and that control comes largely from
the top down through the Lega. 150 Thus the Lega-affiliated cooperatives,
like the firms often found in other countries that are only beneficially
owned by their workers, may indicate only that certain types of firms can
be operated successfully on behalf of their workers, but not necessarily by
the workers or their elected representatives. Furthermore, in both France
and Italy the statutes governing worker cooperatives impose on them a
quasi-nonprofit structure, requiring that a substantial fraction of net earn-
ings be retained in accounts not distributable to the worker-members and
prohibiting the distribution of net assets to members upon dissolution.15 1
England has far fewer worker cooperatives than France or Italy, but
the pattern is similar. Omitting partnerships of service professionals, such
as solicitors, those cooperatives that have been successful over the long run
can be divided into two groups. The first group has its origins in the labor
and cooperative movements of the late nineteenth century. The numbers
of these firms have been declining throughout this century; by one count
there were only sixteen remaining in 1973. The firms in this group are
typically small artisanal cooperatives; more than half are in printing or
bootmaking.1 5' The second group consists of more recently-founded firms
associated with the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM).
There were eleven of these firms as of 1977. They include some moder-
ate-sized industrial enterprises with a fair record of success. The ICOM
firms, however, are not fully worker-owned. The workers have no claim
on the firms' net assets, their rights to participate in current net earnings
are constrained, and ultimate authority over important aspects of the
firms' affairs are in the hands of trustees who are not elected by the work-
ers.15 3 In short, these firms are, like many other so-called worker coopera-
149. Although the available sources do not address the issue clearly, it seems plausible that the
construction cooperatives, which are typically small, often contain only workers from a single trade,
such as electricians or bricklayers, thus further assuring homogeneity of interest among the members.
150. R. OAKEsHOTT, supra note 28, at 162-63.
151. Id. at 141, 154; Zevi, supra note 32, at 242.
152. R. OAKESHOTT, supra note 28, at 52-73.
153. Id. at 74-107.
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tives, in important part simply managed on behalf of their workers and
not actually controlled by them.
In summary, the experience in these countries seems to provide little
affirmative evidence that large firms with heterogeneous workforces can
operate successfully under full worker ownership, if by full worker own-
ership we mean that the workers have complete claim to the firm's
residual earnings and that ultimate authority over the firm's affairs is in
the hands of the workers or their elected representatives.
E. Other Types of Cooperatives
The conclusion that worker ownership works, but only when the
worker-owners have highly homogeneous interests, is reinforced by the
experience with other types of cooperatives. Both producer and consumer
cooperatives of a variety of types are extremely common in the American
economy. For example, although consumer cooperatives are rare in retail
enterprise, there are large numbers of wholesale and supply firms that are
organized as consumer cooperatives and that have as their customer-
members retail stores, manufacturing firms, or farms. Similarly, agricul-
tural products are commonly marketed, and sometimes processed, by
farmer-owned producer cooperatives. Many of these producer and con-
sumer cooperatives are very large firms with hundreds or thousands of
members. And democratic governance commonly works quite well in even
the largest of these firms: The members of the board of directors are
elected democratically by the members and are clearly responsible (and
responsive) to them, rather than being effectively appointed by the firm's
management as in many investor-owned firms. In virtually all situations
in which they have prospered, however, these cooperatives are character-
ized by extreme homogeneity among their members. The members of the
wholesale and supply cooperatives are typically similar-sized firms that
purchase similar types and quantities of goods from the cooperative. And
the members of the agricultural marketing and processing cooperatives are
typically farms that sell to or through the cooperative a single, highly ho-
mogeneous agricultural commodity.""
VII. EXPERIENCE WITH PARTIAL EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
The importance of governance costs relative to the other costs and bene-
fits of worker ownership is further underscored by the accumulated expe-
rience with various forms of partial worker participation in earnings and
control, forms that fall short of full worker ownership. 5
154. Hansmann, supra note 14, at 288.
155. Recent years have brought rapidly increasing numbers of management buyouts of firms
whose stock had previously been publicly traded. In these transactions, the firm is converted to private
ownership through the repurchase of all of its stock by a group including the firm's senior manage-
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A. Employee Stock Ownership Plans
The widespread adoption of ESOPs is not an unbiased indicator of
their efficiency. Although the ESOP concept has been actively promoted
since the 1950s,"'5 it did not become popular until ESOPs were granted
substantial federal tax subsidies beginning in 1974-tax subsidies that
have since been broadened and deepened1 7-and until it was discovered
that creation of an ESOP could be a useful defensive tactic for manage-
ment in an attempted corporate takeover. 5 It is entirely possible that,
without these special advantages, ESOPs would remain rare.
Whatever the motivation for adopting ESOPs, however, one of the most
striking facts about them is that they generally provide for participation
only in earnings and not in control. Only rarely are they structured to
give the workers a significant voice in the governance of the firm.
To begin with, a substantial fraction of the stock held by ESOPs is
non-voting stock. 5 ' Further, the power to vote the voting stock held by an
ESOP is commonly not exercised by the workers who are the beneficiaries
of the plan. In the latter regard, the tax law plays a significant role. For a
privately-held corporation to obtain the tax benefits provided for ESOPs,
the power to vote stock held by the corporation's ESOP need not be
passed through to the workers, but rather can be voted by the plan's trus-
tee.' 60 The trustee, in turn, can be appointed by the firm's management
without consultation with the workers who are the plan's beneficiaries. In
ment. The resulting firms might appear to be instances of a reductive form of worker ownership in
which the worker-owners are confined to the firm's managers. As it is, however, these firms do not
provide much evidence concerning the viability of worker ownership. Typically only a very small
number of managers participates in ownership of these firms, and these managers come from a fairly
narrow stratum of the firm's employees. Further, the managers' share in ownership is often modest.
In one sample of fifty management buyouts, for example, the officers of the median firm already
owned 11.5% of the firm's equity before the transaction and increased this only to 16.7% afterward;
other investors continued to hold the great bulk of the firm's stock. A. Smith, Corporate Ownership
Structure and Performance: The Case of Management Buyouts 1988 (unpublished manuscript; on file
with author).
156. See L. KELSO & M. ADLER, supra note 3; Granadas, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: An
Analysis of Current Reform Proposals, 14 J. L. REFORM 15 (1980).
157. For a review of the tax and corporate finance advantages of ESOPs prior to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, see Doernberg & Macey, supra note 6. With the exception of the Tax Credit ESOPs,
which were already slated for extinction after 1986, the 1986 Act reaffirmed and extended somewhat
the preexisting tax subsidies to ESOPs (the most important of which was the exclusion from taxable
income of fifty percent of the interest income from loans to ESOPs, I.R.C. § 133 (1988)) and added
some new subsidies (including, prominently, a 50% exclusion from estate tax for the proceeds from the
sale of stock to an ESOP or "eligible worker-owned cooperative." I.R.C. § 2057 (1988)).
158. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc., v. Polaroid, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,176 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 6, 1989, as amended Mar. 20, 1989) (permitting creation of ESOP as takeover defense under
particular circumstances).
159. Although the median ESOP holds 10% of the total stock of the sponsoring company, it holds
only 5% of the voting rights. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 24, at 39-40.
160. More precisely, this is the case for election of directors and other routine matters subject to
vote. The tax code requires that, even in closely held corporations, the votes be passed through to
workers on major corporate restructurings such as mergers or liquidations. I.R.C. § 409(e)(3) (1989).
Even these voting rights, it should be noted, can be evaded by management through such measures as
elimination or conversion of the plan itself.
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publicly-held corporations, in contrast, voting power must be passed
through to the workers on all ESOP stock actually allocated to the work-
ers-which is to say, not purchased through borrowing, as in the popular
"leveraged" ESOP. 6'
These tax law provisions are evidently important in understanding the
pattern of ESOPs that has evolved. If we exclude so-called tax credit ES-
OPs-that is, ESOPs created under a special (and now repealed) provi-
sion effectively providing for a one hundred percent tax subsidy to the
plan-roughly ninety percent of all ESOPs are in privately-held firms.
Moreover, there are very few publicly-traded firms in which an ESOP
has more than twenty percent of the firm's stock, and perhaps none in
which the plan has a majority of the stock.182 Thus firms in which a
majority of the stock is held by an ESOP are, it appears, almost exclu-
sively privately held. And, although the law permits (but does not require)
that votes on ESOP stock be passed through to employees in privately
held firms, this is done in only a distinct minority of such firms."1 3 Thus,
ESOPs generally do not permit much worker participation in control of
the firm in either publicly or privately held firms. In fact, an extensive
1986 survey found that only 4 percent of sampled firms with ESOPs had
any nonmanagerial employee representatives on their boards of directors
and found no firms with ESOPs in which employee representatives con-
stituted a majority of the board of directors. 6 4
What is particularly interesting here is that voting rights have not been
passed through to workers even in some firms-such as the much-
publicized Weirton Steel Company-in which the ESOP owns one hun-
.dred percent of the firm's stock. Rather, voting rights are held by the
ESOP's trustee, who in turn is appointed by a self-perpetuating board. 65
161. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1989).
162. J. BLASI, supra note 26, at 90-93, 103. A 1987 survey reported one publicly traded com-
pany in which an ESOP held more than 50% of the company's stock. Employee Benefit Research
Institute, Issue Brief 11 (No. 74, Jan. 1988). Note, moreover, that ESOPs in publicly-held companies
are commonly so-called leveraged ESOPs in which a substantial fraction of the stock held by the plan
has been purchased with funds borrowed by the plan. In such ESOPs, the tax law permits the trustee
rather than the workers to vote that portion of the stock that has been financed with debt, thus
diluting the workers' voice.
163. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 24, at 39, reports that only 25% of nonlever-
aged ESOPs (the type most commonly found in privately held firms) pass through full voting rights to
plan participants.
164. Id. at 40. These figures may understate the degree of effective worker representation
achieved through ESOPs. It has been suggested to me in correspondence that, among firms with
ESOPs, "there are several hundred in which the employees elect the board of directors," but in which
the employee representatives are evidently principally drawn from management. Letter from Corey
Rosen (Apr. 11, 1990) (on file with author).
165. In 1982, the Weirton Steel Company was purchased on behalf of its workers through an
ESOP, which acquired 100% of the company's stock. The workers were not, however, given the right
to vote the stock. Rather, all voting rights involving the board of directors were given to the ESOP
trustee, who was in turn to vote as directed by a special committee of the board. The workers were
given only the minimum voting rights required by law, namely the right to vote on all matters requir-
ing a more-than-majority vote, such as amendments to the corporate charter or liquidation of the
corporation. J. BLASI, supra note 26, at 211-16.
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In effect, these firms are operated as nonprofit institutions in which direc-
tors with control but no claim on residual earnings are charged with man-
aging the firm as fiduciaries for the benefit of the workers.1 6
It follows that ESOPs are quite paradoxical when viewed in terms of
conventional perspectives on worker ownership. The common view seems
to be that worker participation in corporate governance is highly desirable
but that the risk and the high cost of capital that workers face if they
participate in ownership of a firm that is at all capital-intensive are seri-
ous liabilities. By these criteria, one would expect worker ownership to be
structured to maximize workers' participation in control but to minimize
their contribution of capital. ESOPs, however, have just the opposite char-
acter. Since they provide for participation in residual earnings through
purchase of stock (rather than, for example, through a simple profit-
sharing plan), they amplify workers' problems of illiquidity and risk-
bearing. Yet at the same time they typically give workers no voice at all in
the management of the enterprise."7
If the advantages of worker participation in control exceeded its costs,
then one would surely expect to see much more worker control in firms
with ESOPs, and particularly in the 1000 or more firms in which the
ESOP owns a majority of the firm's stock. These firms, or their workers,
are already incurring most of the principal costs of worker owner-
ship-particularly the high costs of bearing undiversified risk that worker
ownership imposes on workers. The fact that workers typically do not
participate in governance of these firms suggests strongly that those re-
sponsible for structuring them believe that any reduction in agency costs
that might result from making management directly accountable to the
firm's workers, even though the workers are already the firm's beneficial
owners, would be outweighed by the costs-perhaps in the form of ineffi-
cient decisions or high process costs-that would be engendered by the
political process required for such accountability.' 68
To be sure, the creation of ESOPs in which votes are not passed
through to workers can probably be explained at least in part as an effort
In order to obtain additional capital, Weirton has recently completed a public offering of a minority
interest in its stock. Moreover, as of 1989, employees were to obtain limited rights to resell their stock
to the company. These steps may ultimately lead to a return to investor control. See Has Weirton's
ESOP Worked Too Well?, Bvs. WK., Jan. 23, 1989, at 66; Weirton Steel Says Initial Public Offering
Has Become Effective, Wall St. J., June 15, 1989, at C21.
166. For further discussion of firms like these that are only beneficially owned by their workers,
see infra Section X(A).
167. Typically adoption of an ESOP not only fails to bring an increase in workers' formal partici-
pation in control but also fails to bring an increase in informal participation by workers in firm
decision-making. See Employee Benefit Research Institute, supra note 6.
168. In firms in which the ESOP does not own 100% of the firm's stock, passing control to the
workers might also increase the costs associated with that portion of the firm's capital that is provided
by non-worker shareholders (for example, by creating the risk that the workers will opportunistically
exploit them). This is not a problem in firms in which the ESOP already owns 100% of the firm's
equity.
1990] 1799
The Yale Law Journal
on the part of corporate managers to preserve or increase their autonomy.
Such ESOPs protect managers both from hostile takeovers and from direct
accountability to the workers. But managerial opportunism alone seems
insufficient to explain the virtually complete absence of worker control
even in firms in which an ESOP holds a majority of the firm's equity. If
creation of an ESOP with pass-through of votes to the workers would be
more efficient than either no ESOP or an ESOP without pass-through of
votes, then one would expect to see hostile takeovers undertaken with the
aim of creating such a structure-or at least to see such ESOPs put in
place upon the successful completion of hostile takeovers undertaken for
other reasons. In fact, one would expect to see employees themselves, per-
haps through their unions, participating in such hostile takeovers (as the
pilots' union has been, for example, at United Air Lines).
Widespread experimentation with ESOPs is still too new to permit un-
equivocal lessons about worker ownership to be drawn from them. But so
far the experience with ESOPs provides little affirmative evidence that
direct worker participation in the control of enterprise through ownership
can be made both effective and efficient with a heterogeneous workforce,
while it provides considerable circumstantial evidence suggesting that such
participation may be quite costly.
B. Beneficial Ownership
As we have just noted, firms in which an ESOP owns all of the com-
pany's equity are typically not controlled by their workers but by trustees
who manage the firms as fiduciaries for the workers. Thus, these firms
are not fully worker-owned but rather, in a sense, are nonprofit firms that
are operated on behalf of their workers."6 9 Similarly, the most successful
large-scale experiments with worker-owned industrial enterprise in Brit-
ain, the ICOM cooperatives, have also been structured with only benefi-
cial worker ownership."' And, as we have seen, the same is also true to
some extent of Mondragon and of the French and Italian worker coopera-
tives. In short, examples of successful worker ownership in industrial en-
terprise commonly do not involve true worker cooperatives but rather
firms that are only beneficially owned by their workers.
A plausible inference to be drawn from this pattern, it has been sug-
gested here, is that worker control would be inefficiently costly with a
workforce as heterogeneous as those to be found in most industrial firms.
One might concede this point, however, and nevertheless argue that even
169. The essential characteristic of a nonprofit firm is that it has no owners in the sense defined
here-that is, no class of individuals who participate in both control and residual earnings. More
particularly, the individuals who exercise control over a nonprofit firm are barred from distributing to
themselves its net earnings. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838-40 (1980).
170. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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firms that are only beneficially owned by their workers are often prefera-
ble to investor-owned firms. Indeed, many advocates of worker ownership
explicitly call for giving workers only the type of attenuated property
rights that are found at Mondragon and elsewhere.' 71
Some of the most important benefits of worker ownership discussed in
Section III could presumably still be realized with only beneficial owner-
ship instead of full worker ownership. The problems of monitoring work-
ers, worker lock-in, strategic bargaining behavior, and poor communica-
tion of worker preferences arise principally because of the conflict of
interest between workers and owners that characterizes an investor-owned
firm. Even beneficial worker ownership promises to eliminate that conflict
of interest in substantial part.
On the other hand, serious countervailing inefficiencies may result if
industrial firms are structured, in effect, as nonprofits in which workers
have beneficial ownership but lack essential elements of full ownership,
including ultimate authority to replace top management or to compel dis-
tributions of earnings or assets. To begin with, such a structure largely
insulates the firm's management from any direct incentives to perform ef-
ficiently. Further, such firms are subject to special problems in adjusting
their capital stock. When nonprofit firms need a rapid infusion of capital,
they often have difficulty raising it since they cannot sell equity shares.'72
Conversely, when market conditions permit, nonprofit firms tend, by re-
taining earnings, to accumulate capital well beyond the amount needed for
an efficient scale of operation.'73 This occurs, it appears, because accumu-
lation serves the interests of the firm's management, who gain from it an
expanded empire and greater security. And the firm's beneficial owners,
lacking voting control, are powerless to prevent such excessive accumula-
tion even though it leaves them worse off than they would be if the earn-
ings involved were distributed to them rather than reinvested.
For these reasons, only if two conditions are satisfied does it make sense
171. E.g., R. DAHL, supra note 2, at 140-52; Ellerman, Workers' Cooperatives: The Question of
Legal Structure, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 270-73; Vanek, Intro-
duction, in SELF-MANAGEMENT: EcoNoMic LIBERATION OF MAN, supra note 2, at 24.
172. See Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other Factors on the Market Share of
Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 71, 77-78 (1987) (reporting empirical finding
that market share of nonprofit firms grows much more slowly than that of for-profit firms when
demand increases rapidly in a given industry, suggesting nonprofits are constrained in their access to
capital).
173. See, e.g., Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3
(1990). The same phenomenon occurs in firms that, although not formally organized as nonprofits,
have similar organizational characteristics. See, e.g., Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mu-
tual In',urance Companies?, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 1068, 1091-92 (mutual life insurance).
Note that a nonprofit firm that, as is common, itself "owns" at least some fraction of the capital it
employs (whether it obtained that capital through gifts or retained earnings) can continue to reinvest
the return on that capital and thus grow even if the rate of return it is earning on that capital is below
the prevailing market rate of return on capital. As a consequence, a nonprofit firm can be less efficient
than its competitors and still gain market share over them, even in the absence of tax exemptions or
other subsidies.
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to organize an industrial firm as a nonprofit, managed on behalf of but
not by its workers: (1) for reasons such as those surveyed in Section III,
there would be severe inefficiencies in contracting for labor if the firm
were investor-owned; (2) for reasons such as those surveyed in Section V,
collective governance by the workers would be extremely costly. In such
circumstances, the inefficiencies of the nonprofit form might be less than
either the costs of labor contracting that would accompany investor owner-
ship or the costs of collective decision-making that would accompany true
worker ownership.
The fact that worker-owned firms in the industrial sector are typically
only beneficially owned by their workers suggests that condition (2) holds.
The fact that even beneficial worker ownership rarely appears in complex
industrial firms where it is not heavily subsidized 74 suggests that condi-
tion (1) does not hold. Taken together, these conclusions imply, in turn,
two things. First, if workers are to be given some form of ownership inter-
est in an industrial firm, it is most efficient to structure the firm as a
nonprofit managed on behalf of, but not by, its workers. Second, the costs
associated with contracting for labor on the market-that is, the ineffi-
ciencies of investor ownership-are nevertheless insufficient to justify the
costs of adopting the nonprofit form to avoid them.1 5 In short, industrial
firms that are only beneficially owned by their workers may be more effi-
cient than fully worker-owned firms, but are evidently less efficient than
investor-owned firms.
174. Four of the ten ICOM cooperatives in England were essentially donated to their workers by
their former owners. R. OAKESHOrT, supra note 28, at 74.
175. There are other situations in which it appears to be efficient to give beneficial ownership of a
firm to a class of individuals who transact with the firm. As the discussion in the text suggests, these
situations typically have two characteristics in common. First, ordinary contractual devices are insuffi-
cient in themselves to protect the individuals in question from highly costly opportunistic behavior on
the part of the firm. Consequently, granting ownership to someone other than those individuals will
make transactions between those individuals and the firm costly or infeasible. Second, the class of
individuals in question cannot effectively exercise control over the firm. Consequently, it is not possi-
ble to protect them simply by giving them full ownership. Rather, the firm can at best be managed on
their behalf by trustees.
These are the circumstances under which firms formally organized as nonprofits typically arise.
Organizations that are donatively financed, such as the American Cancer Society and the Red Cross,
are the most obvious examples. The directors of these organizations are fiduciaries who manage the
organizations on behalf of their donors, who are too numerous, dispersed, and transitory to exercise
effective voting control. See Hansmann, supra note 169, at 843-66. That article argues that nonprofits
typically arise to protect consumers of the firm's services. But nonprofits can also serve to protect
individuals who sell services to the firm. Just as there are both producer and consumer cooperatives,
there can be both producer and consumer nonprofits. Fully worker-owned firms are producer cooper-
atives; firms that are only beneficially owned by their workers are producer nonprofits.
Some firms, though not formally organized as nonprofits, are nominally owned by a class of indi-
viduals who are incapable of exercising effective control, with the result that effective control is en-
tirely in the hands of a self-appointing management. Mutual life insurance companies are a clear
example. Such an ownership structure may often be efficient for reasons similar to those that justify




It has been argued that, since inefficiency is likely to result if either
investors or workers alone have control over decision-making concerning
variables that cannot be explicitly governed by contract between them,
greater efficiency is likely to be achieved if some mechanism for shared
decision-making between workers and investors can be arranged. 17' The
most direct approach to such shared decision-making between workers
and investors is to establish joint control formally by having workers and
investors participate equally in electing representatives to the firm's board
of directors. This is essentially the approach that has been mandated by
law in Germany for all large firms under the label of "codetermina-
tion.11117 From all that has been said above, however, one would expect
that true sharing of formal control, through the firm's internal political
process, between two such heterogeneous groups as workers and investors
would be highly inefficient. And indeed this seems consistent with the
German experience. Codetermination does not generally seem to have re-
sulted in effective worker participation in control of the corporation at the
board level; rather, control essentially remains in the hands of investors.
Instead, the real value of codetermination lies, it appears, in the access it
gives workers to accurate and credible information about the firm that
would otherwise be confined to management. 17  This information can then
be used by the workers when bargaining with management in contexts
other than decision-making at the board level-as when the firm's man-
agement bargains with individual workers, with the works councils, and
with the unions-where shared information presumably reduces the in-
centive for, and hence the costs of, strategic bargaining behavior. In short,
the primary effect of codetermination has arguably been just to provide
workers with some informational seats on the board of directors.1 7 9
176. The most sophisticated exposition of this view is offered in M. AOKI, THE COOPERATIVE
GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984), and in Aoki, A Model of the Finn as a Stockholder-Employee
Cooperatire Game, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 600 (1980).
177. See generally FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CO-DETERMINATION
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1980).
178. Aoki has himself noted this. M. AOKI, supra note 176, at 167.
179. A very different approach to worker participation in the control of enterprise was offered by
the Swedish Meidner Plan, initially proposed in the early 1970's, under which a controlling interest
in large firms would eventually come to be held in a mutual fund controlled by the Swedish national
labor federation. The Plan provided that workers in individual firms would be given the right to vote
the shares initially accumulated by the fund up to a total of 20% of the firm's total stock; shares
accumulated by the fund beyond that would be voted by a labor board covering the entire industrial
sector in which the firm operated. R. MEIDNER, EMPLOYEE INVESTMENT FUNDS (1978).
By thus providing for only a limited degree of worker control at the level of the firm, the Plan
might have avoided some of the internal political costs associated with simple worker ownership while
still promising to reduce the incentive for a firm's management to behave opportunistically with re-
spect to its workers. On the other hand, control of firms by labor-dominated boards at a sectoral level
may have engendered some inefficiencies of its own, such as monopolization. In any event, all efforts
to use such a device to affect corporate control seem to have been abandoned in 1982 when, instead of
the original Meidner Plan, a much more modest scheme was enacted that created five regional wage
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D. Unionization
In those firms in which workers bargain collectively through labor un-
ions, workers already employ a political process for the purpose of aggre-
gating their individual interests. The difference between such an arrange-
ment and the type of collective representation involved in worker
ownership, of course, is that the union's political process is used not to
select the firm's management but rather to select representatives to bar-
gain with a management chosen by the firm's shareholders.
It might at first seem that unions have most of the costs and few of the
benefits of worker ownership. On the one hand, because unions do not
involve full worker ownership, they do not entirely remove the possibility
that the management of the firm will behave opportunistically toward the
workers (or vice-versa). Yet, on the other hand, they potentially have all
the costs of collective decision-making among workers.
There is probably some truth to this view, and this may help explain
the declining importance in the United States today of the adversarial
model of collective bargaining that was adopted in American law in the
1930s."8 ° Whatever the overall efficiency of that model of worker repre-
sentation, however, there are many ways in which it has been adjusted in
apparent recognition of the problems of collective representation on which
we have been focusing. To begin with, workers with managerial or super-
visory responsibilities are generally not unionized; rather, it is usually
only the workers who comprise the lowest, most horizontal stratum among
the firm's employees who belong to a union. 8' Moreover, where the jobs
held by the unionized workers are particularly diverse, the workers are
frequently split up into separate bargaining units. As a consequence, there
is commonly a fair degree of homogeneity of interest among the workers
represented by any given union.
Further, unions typically bargain with management over only a rela-
tively narrow range of issues immediately touching on the employees' in-
terests, such as wages, hours, and job classifications.' 82 Other issues, such
earners' funds, none of which is permitted to own more than 8% of the stock of any single firm.
Flanagan, Efficien
' 
and Equality in Swedish Labor Markets, in THE SWEDISH ECONOmY 125, 170
(B. Bosworth & A. Rivlin eds. 1987).
180. Union members constituted 29% of the workforce in 1975 but only 17% in 1987. U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1989, at 415, 416 (Table Nos.
683 & 684).
181. Where more senior employees form unions, they tend to be highly homogeneous, as in the
case of teachers or pilots.
182. Under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, only "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" are mandatory subjects of bargaining between the employer and
the union. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5). This provision does not prevent negotiation between the union and
the employer concerning other issues, such as investment decisions, but instead simply makes bargain-
ing over such issues optional (or "permissive") rather than mandatory. For a discussion of the current
interpretation of the scope of the duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5), see Stone, Labor and tle
Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 73,
86-96 (1988).
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as the firm's investment policies or even its policy on layoffs, are seldom
bargained over even though in theory it might be more efficient if workers
were to be more actively involved in deciding such issues."i 3 Indeed, un-
ions themselves seem to avoid broader involvement of this sort, intention-
ally keeping the scope of bargaining narrowly confined."' There may be
a variety of reasons for this. But, whether it is cause or consequence, by
adopting this strategy a union avoids some possibilities for costly internal
conflict; expanding the scope of bargaining might bring substantial costs,
in terms of both process and outcomes, that would outweigh any concomi-
tant benefits. By confining themselves to such matters as wages, hours,
and job classifications, unions can largely avoid the necessity of making
invidious distinctions among their members. They can leave that task to
management and adopt the simpler and less controversial strategy of
pressing for greater equality with respect to the subjects they bargain
over.
Finally, it is often observed that unions are seldom democratic."8 5 This
is commonly deplored in both the social science and policy literature,
much as the general absence of genuine shareholder democracy in pub-
licly-held business corporations was deplored twenty years ago. But it
may be that greater democracy would bring much higher governance costs
without a corresponding improvement in the accuracy with which the
union members' preferences are represented. Michels' iron law of oligar-
chy188 may in fact be an economic law, at least where unions are
concerned.
Similar considerations may help explain why it is that bargaining be-
tween a union and a firm is often conducted in large part by representa-
tives from the union's national office and not just by local union officials:
This helps defuse even further the problem of local internal politics.
In short, experience with collective bargaining does not provide strong
evidence that democratic processes can be effectively employed to represent
the interests of a heterogeneous class of workers in general corporate deci-
sion-making.
VIII. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH WORKER GOVERNANCE
One might concede that the high costs of worker governance have been
a critical constraint on worker ownership but nevertheless believe that
these costs have some other source than heterogeneity of interest among
the workers or that, whatever the source of the costs, they can be made
183. See Aoki, supra note 176, at 151-71.
184. There is some evidence, however, that unions are beginning to aspire to a broader role in
corporate decision-making. See Stone, supra note 182.
185. E.g., S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 3-13 (1956).
186. R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1962).
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manageable through experience and organizational innovation. Two such
arguments deserve special attention.
A. Workers May Lack Managerial Skills
It is sometimes argued that worker ownership is common among service
professionals but rare among industrial workers simply because the latter
lack the skills necessary for governance of a firm. For example, blue-collar
workers may have insufficient knowledge of management or finance to
select or police the firm's managers effectively. Or such workers may be
inclined to be short-sighted in planning; the high salience of wages and
working conditions may make the workers focus on those concerns to the
detriment of new investment.
Quite possibly there is some truth to this. The prevailing patterns of
ownership suggest, however, that the skill level of workers is much less
important than their homogeneity of interest in making worker ownership
feasible. Worker ownership is evidently viable among blue-collar employ-
ees where there is little diversity of interest, as with the drivers in the
transportation cooperatives or the semi-skilled workers in the plywood
manufacturing cooperatives. Conversely, worker ownership is rare among
white-collar workers who are not highly homogeneous, such as those em-
ployed in retailing, hotel and restaurant services, health care other than
physician services, or computer programming.
An individual worker need not herself have the expertise to make man-
agerial decisions in order for her to exercise her voice effectively as an
owner. She need only be able to vote intelligently in electing the firm's
directors. Consider, for example, a firm like General Motors. It is quite
believable that even an assembly line worker at GM is in a position to act
more thoughtfully in electing directors than are most of that firm's public
shareholders, since she is likely to be more willing and able to obtain
relevant information about the candidates and to act on it. Furthermore,
many of GM's workers are not assembly line workers, but rather finan-
cial planners, design engineers, foremen, and marketing executives. These
latter types of workers presumably have a great deal of information rele-
vant to an assessment of the firm's management, and are also likely to
have special influence with less informed blue collar workers in deciding
whom to elect as directors. Thus, it is quite plausible that, if the workers
owned GM, they would elect a more effective board of directors and hold
them more accountable than do the firm's current public shareholders-or
at least that this would be the case if, contrary to fact, there were no
important conflicts of interest among the firm's workers.
1806 [Vol. 99: 1749
Worker Ownership
B. Workers Lack Experience with Governance
It has also been argued that a major obstacle to widespread worker
ownership is simply the absence of the customs, mores, and standard pro-
cedures necessary to make worker governance effective. 18 7 According to
this theory, workers must first become accustomed to the notion of manag-
ing the firm where they work and develop the experience and methods
needed for the task. This is presumably a cumulative process; workers in
one firm can benefit from the example of another. Consequently, once the
proper institutions and procedures are well established and there is sub-
stantial accumulated experience in working with them, worker ownership
will compete effectively with investor ownership in a broad range of set-
tings, including those in which there is substantial heterogeneity of inter-
est among the workers.
We cannot dismiss this argument out of hand. Organizational innova-
tion and diffusion have often proceeded slowly in other settings.' But, in
the case at hand, there is strong reason to be skeptical.
Institutions for collective governance play a central role in American
culture and are familiar to most citizens in a broad range of settings, from
presidential elections to the Girl Scouts and the local Moose Lodge.
Workers, in particular, have long been familiar with collective governance
in unions-an important experience discussed above. In such a cultural
environment, it is hard to argue that lack of experience with collective
self-governance in general is a major obstacle to the viability of worker
ownership. At most one can argue that the obstacle is lack of knowledge
about, or experience with, the specific types of governance mechanisms
that are needed to perinit employees to act collectively in managing indus-
trial enterprise.
The experience with ESOPs and at Mondragon suggests that the most
suitable forms for worker self-governance in large-scale enterprise may
involve a complex combination of representative and fiduciary mecha-
nisms. Further experimentation and experience in developing these orga-
nizational forms may therefore help to reduce their costs. Perhaps there
are sufficient gains yet to be had in this respect to yield important im-
provements in the viability of worker ownership. But this seems unlikely.
Even in the United States there has already been considerable experience
with forms for worker self-governance in service enterprise and in small-
scale industry. Further, there has accumulated over many decades sub-
stantial experience with consumer cooperatives and with other types of
187. E.g., P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 91-107; M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 2, at
183; J. ROTHSCHILD & J. WHITT, supra note 72, at 66.
188. For example, it appears that it took nearly 40 years for the multidivisional form of manage-
rial organization to replace the older and evidently less efficient line-and-staff form throughout Amer-
ican industry. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REvoLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (1977).
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producer cooperatives (such as farmer-owned processing and marketing
cooperatives), some of which rank among the nation's largest industrial
firms. These firms provide useful models for the governance of worker
cooperatives as well. Moreover, their success suggests strongly that where
there are substantial gains to be had from collective ownership, its devel-
opment will not long be inhibited simply by lack of experience with insti-
tutions for collective governance in the particular setting involved."8 9
The experience with housing cooperatives and condominiums is instruc-
tive in this regard. 9 Prior to 1961 the condominium form was essentially
unknown in the United States, and its close cousin, the housing coopera-
tive, was largely confined to the rich. Since then, however, changes in
property law have made the condominium form feasible, and develop-
ments in taxation have made it financially attractive for a broad range of
individuals. As a consequence, the condominium form has now spread
rapidly and widely through the housing market even though it requires, at
its core, a mechanism for collective self-governance by the owner-
occupants. There is reason to believe that collective governance in housing
condominiums is costly and that, in part for that reason, without substan-
tial tax subsidies the condominium form would be far less common than it
is. "' Moreover, it appears that the mechanisms for collective governance
in condominiums are continuing to evolve-for example, by delegating in-
creasing authority to hired management-in ways that reduce these costs.
Nevertheless, the basic governance mechanisms necessary to make condo-
miniums viable in competition with investor-owned (that is, rental) build-
ings developed quite rapidly. If so many individuals can so quickly be-
come accustomed to collectively governing the apartment building where
they live, why can they not also quickly become accustomed to collectively
governing the firm where they work? Evidently more is required to make
worker ownership viable than simply additional time to get accustomed to
it.
IX. LEGAL AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES TO WORKER OWNERSHIP
It is often suggested that legal and cultural obstacles are principally
responsible for the paucity of worker-owned enterprise in market econo-
mies. Upon examination, however, it appears that these obstacles, if sig-
nificant at all, are far less important than the costs of worker ownership
surveyed above.
189. For further discussion of the nature, size, and governance of consumer and producer coopera-
tives in general, see Hansmann, supra note 14.
190. For a more detailed discussion, see Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing






In the United States, at least, it is hard to argue that the law has been a
serious obstacle to the success of worker ownership. There appear to be no
explicit legal prohibitions on worker ownership of enterprise. On the con-
trary, there is at least one business-law-in which investor-owned firms
have been explicitly proscribed by law throughout the United States. 92
In general, organizational law-that is, corporation law and partner-
ship law-is sufficiently flexible to permit the formation of nearly any
type of worker cooperative. In theory, the cooperative corporation statutes
should provide the simplest and most direct approach, and in some states
those statutes are in fact suitable for this purpose.' 93 In many jurisdic-
tions, however, the business corporation statutes are more workable, ow-
ing largely to the rudimentary and sometimes narrowly constricted char-
acter of the cooperative statutes.194 With the business corporation statutes,
some manipulation is required to assure that earnings and votes are dis-
tributed to workers in the fashion appropriate for a worker cooperative. It
has been argued, therefore, that worker-owned firms have been disadvan-
taged vis-A-vis investor-owned firms in that statutes embodying a standard
form have not been available for the former while they have for the
latter.' 95
The presence of such a standard form may have some significant effects.
It not only reduces the transaction costs of forming a firm (for example,
by making the form comprehensible to a broader range of attorneys) but
also gives the form a degree of visibility, recognizability, and legitimacy it
might otherwise lack. 9' A bank lending officer, for example, might well
feel more secure in making a loan to a worker cooperative formed accord-
ing to the pattern set forth by a special worker cooperative statute than in
making a loan to a worker cooperative formed through complex manipu-
192. See infra Section X(D).
193. For example, the Wisconsin cooperative corporation statute, in providing that net earnings
are to be paid to the corporation's "patrons," seems to impose no limitations that would prevent the
organization's workers from being classified as its "patrons." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 185.45 (West 1957).
194. Ellerman & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker Cooperative Statute in
Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441 (1982-83).
Among the plywood cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest, some are incorporated under cooperative
corporation statutes and some under business corporation statutes. For example, of the four coopera-
tives involved in the tax cases cited infra note 197, two were incorporated under cooperative corpora-
tion statutes (one in Oregon and one in Washington) and two were incorporated under business
corporation statutes (one in Oregon and one in Washington).
Firms of service professionals must generally be formed as partnerships or under special profes-
sional corporation statutes to preserve personal liability for professional torts.
195. E.g., id.
196. See, e.g., id. at 453:
[Formerly] the worker cooperative corporate form lacked the legitimacy accorded by express
statutory authority.
The new [Massachusetts] worker cooperative statute was intended to give such enterprises
legitimacy and familiarity in the eyes of lenders, suppliers, customers, government officials,
managers, and workers.
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lation of a business corporation statute. It seems unlikely, however, that
the inconvenience of the lack of a standard statutory form has in itself
been an important obstacle to the development of worker-owned enter-
prise. To begin with, the business corporation statutes generally serve as a
standard form only for publicly held corporations; closely held business
corporations, which are extremely common, often require some special
drafting. Also, there have long been conspicuous examples of worker-
owned corporations, such as the plywood cooperatives, that have been suc-
cessful without the benefit of standard statutory forms and that are availa-
ble to serve as models for other worker-owned firms.
Furthermore, tax law is probably much more important than organiza-
tional law in determining which organizational forms prosper. And tax
law has long favored, rather than discouraged, worker ownership. At least
since 1931, net earnings distributed to members of a workers' cooperative
have escaped (at least to a substantial degree) the corporate income tax
that is levied on net earnings distributed to investors.197 In addition, since
1964, net earnings that are retained rather than distributed by a worker
cooperative have been similarly free from the corporate tax. 98 Finally,
since the early 1970's a varying, but in most years very substantial, pack-
age of tax benefits has existed for employee stock ownership plans.1 " '
B. Ideological Hostility
It has been argued that, whatever the formal legal rules and institutions
that bear on the matter, American society in general, or key actors such as
bankers in particular, are hostile to worker ownership on ideological
grounds and have used their authority to hamper its development and de-
prive it of cultural legitimacy. " '0
Undoubtedly some Americans see worker ownership as socialistic and
therefore evil. But it seems hard to argue that there is strong ideological
resistance to worker ownership in general. As noted in the Introduction,
worker ownership in fact has shown broad ideological appeal to the right
197. Olympia Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 892 (1931) (worker cooperative can deduct
patronage dividend as wages even if, with dividend, effective hourly wage received by members sub-
stantially exceeds that prevailing in industry, since members of cooperatives are more productive than
hired employees). Since 1964, worker cooperatives have been held to qualify for the treatment ac-
corded other types of cooperatives under Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code. Linnton Ply-
wood Assoc. v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D. Or. 1976); Linnton Plywood Assoc. v.
United States, 236 F. Supp. 227, 228 (D. Or. 1964); Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44
T.C. 305, 322 (1965). This provides an even more generous result than the wage deduction granted in
Oly0npia Veneer, supra, for it permits the exclusion from gross income, for purposes of the corporate
income tax, of all net earnings that derive from work performed by members (as opposed to hired
workers) in a worker cooperative and that are allocated as patronage dividends.
198. Linnton Plywood, 236 F. Supp. at 228.
199. See supra text accompanying note 157.
200. E.g., M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 2, at 144, 188.
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as well as the left in the United States, and the advocates of ESOPs have
played strongly on this fact.
Moreover, lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, and management
consultants-the actors in society principally responsible for the design of
private business organizations-have long organized themselves in
worker-owned firms. Consequently, they cannot be unaware of the bene-
fits of worker ownership or opposed to it on principle. At worst they can
be accused of hoarding the benefits of worker ownership for themselves
and-whether out of spite or ignorance-denying those benefits to firms
in other industries.
X. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The analysis presented so far has been largely positive; we have been
concerned principally with understanding why worker ownership has de-
veloped according to the pattern we observe and what this tells us about
the inherent strengths and weaknesses of this form of organization. We
can, however, derive from this analysis some implications for future
policy.
A. Employee Stock Ownership Plans
The numerous studies of ESOPs that have been undertaken to date,
while not conclusive, have failed to present clear evidence of improvements
in either worker productivity or firm profitability once tax subsidies are
taken into account.2"1 And because ESOPs typically do not provide for
substantial worker participation in governance, and hence do not (except
where the ESOP owns all of the firm's equity) eliminate the conflict of
interest between labor and management, they arguably lack most of the
other benefits, in addition to improved incentives for productivity, that
might accompany full worker ownership. At the same time, ESOPs yield
the poor allocation of risk that is among the most serious disadvantages of
worker ownership. Consequently, ESOPs are arguably less desirable, in
general, than an alternative package consisting of a well-diversified pen-
sion fund and a profit-sharing compensation plan-a combination that of-
fers most of the advantages of ESOPs while lacking the serious disadvan-
tage of requiring that the workers contribute equity capital.
This suggests strongly that ESOPs have been adopted principally to
gain tax subsidies. 202 And the tax subsidies are very difficult to justify as a
matter of policy. This would be true even if ESOPs brought important
201. For a review of the literature, see J. BLAsI, supra note 26, at ch. 8 and Appendix D.
202. As discussed supra text accompanying note 158, in recent years another motivation for
adopting ESOPs has been to help defend managers from corporate takeovers. Whether this motivation
alone would be sufficient to cause many firms to establish ESOPs is impossible to say. In any event,
from a policy point of view, this seems no more principled a reason for ESOPs than the tax subsidies.
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improvements in efficiency, since firms would then have an incentive to
adopt ESOPs even without encouragement from the tax code.2" 3 Given the
doubtful efficiency of ESOPs,20 4 there is no apparent justification for the
tax subsidies at all. Moreover, these subsidies are quite costly, and in-
creasingly so.205 For the latter reason at least, if not on efficiency grounds,
the ESOP tax subsidies are likely soon to be curtailed. In fact, the Chair-
man of the House Ways and Means Committee has already introduced
legislation to repeal the principal tax subsidy to ESOPs.206 And when the
tax subsidies disappear, it seems likely that ESOPs will lose their
popularity.207
One could, of course, argue that we have yet to experiment meaning-
fully with an important variation on the ESOP that might make it effi-
ciency-enhancing: passing votes through to workers in those ESOPs that
hold sufficient stock to give the workers a meaningful share in control.
But that seems unlikely to offer an improvement. Where the ESOP holds
less than one hundred percent of the firm's stock, the workers would have
to share voting control with non-worker investors of capital, and the re-
sulting conflicts of interest between the two groups would give strong in-
centives for inefficient decision-making. And even where the ESOP holds
all of the firm's voting stock, so that the workers alone would control the
firm, the prognosis seems poor from all that has been said here about the
apparent costs of worker governance.
203. To be sure, one could argue that tax incentives accelerate the experimentation and accumula-
tion of experience necessary to cause worker ownership to become viable and accepted, and that this
experimentation and experience are worth subsidizing because their fruits have the character of public
goods, available for all firms and their workers to learn and profit from. Yet, as discussed supra
Section IX(A), it seems unlikely that lack of institutional innovation and experience have been impor-
tant obstacles to the spread of worker ownership.
Alternatively, one might seek to justify tax subsidies to ESOPs on distributional grounds, arguing
that they help to redistribute wealth to the working class. But there seems no reason to believe that
workers, rather than the investors who own the firms in question before the ESOPs are adopted, will
capture most of the benefit of the subsidy.
204. Indeed, perhaps the only dear inference about the efficiency of ESOPs that can be drawn
from their current popularity is that the magnitude of any inefficiencies associated with them proba-
bly do not, in general, exceed the size of the tax subsidies granted them.
205. The GAO estimates that "the cost of ESOP tax incentives averaged between S1.7 billion and
$1.9 billion per year during the period 1977-1983, for a total of $12.1 billion to S13.3 billion over
that period." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 24, at 5. The 50% interest exclusion for
ESOP debt has been estimated, by itself, as likely to reduce tax revenues by eight billion dollars over
the five years beginning in 1989. Rostenkowski Acts to Repeal ESOP Provision, Wall St. J., June 8,
1989, at C1, col. 6 [hereinafter Rostenkowski].
206. Namely, I.R.C. § 133, which grants a 50% interest exclusion on ESOP debt. See Rostenhou-
ski, supra note 205.
207. This not to deny that ESOPs may have some advantages over other types of profit-sharing
plans. One of these may be informational: Although more finely tuned incentive pay schemes with
better risk-sharing properties can undoubtedly be devised, granting workers ownership of stock is an
easily understood means of conveying to workers that they have an interest in the long-run profitabil-
ity of the firm. Ownership of stock may also have a symbolic entitlement or endowment effect, giving
workers a stronger proprietary attitude toward the firm than they would have with an incentive pay
scheme, such as a phantom stock plan, that gives the workers a similar pattern of returns but without
the trappings of ownership. Cf. Knetsch, Thaler & Kahneman, An Experimental Test of the Endow-
ment Effect and the Coase Theorem 1987 (unpublished paper on file with author).
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B. Codetermination and the Fifth Directive
Since 1972 the European Economic Community has been considering a
proposed Fifth Directive on company law that would extend German-
style codetermination to all large firms in Europe, with the modification
that employees would have the right to elect only one-third, rather than
one-half, of the board of directors.20 8 Despite eighteen years of debate, the
Fifth Directive has yet to be enacted. From the analysis offered here, con-
tinued inaction is arguably the best course.
Codetermination, as observed above, evidently has not led to a true
sharing of control between labor and capital in Germany. Rather, its pri-
mary effect appears to have been simply to provide workers with more
credible information about firm policy. It may therefore offer no impor-
tant advantages over a system, such as that which has been in effect in
Sweden since 1976, in which employees are just given an entitlement to
have up to three representatives on the board of directors.20 9
The same is presumably true of the EEC's proposed Fifth Directive. In
granting workers the right to elect only one-third rather than one-half of
the board, that proposal abandons any notion of sharing control equally
between labor and capital. Yet it still grants workers substantially more
representation than seems necessary for informational purposes, and thus
seems to be aiming at a degree of direct labor participation in control of
the firm at the board level. To the extent that it succeeds in this regard it
threatens to lead to the problems of costly decision-making described
above, both in the selection of the worker representatives and, perhaps
more importantly, within the board itself. If, as seems to be the case, col-
lective self-governance is excessively costly even for workers alone when
the labor force is heterogeneous, then there is little reason to believe that
electoral mechanisms, and particularly voting within the board of direc-
tors, will work efficiently when those mechanisms must not only resolve
conflicts among different groups of workers but also deal with the more
serious conflicts of interest between labor and capital.2"' It seems better
policy to leave working control of the board in the hands of either capital
or labor alone and then have the board, or the managers it appoints, deal
with the unrepresented factor simply by contractual means.211
208. For history and documentation, see essays in Workers' Participation in the European Corn-
munitv: The Fifth Directive, in 13 BULL. Comp. LAB. REL. (R. Blanpain, J. Janssen van Raay & A.
Mouty eds. 1984).
209. Act on Board Representation for Employees in Private Enterprise, SFS 1987: 1245 (1987).
The right to invoke the act and to select the representatives is given to the established unions.
210. In this respect Germany, with its conservative, cooperative, and well-disciplined labor move-
ment, may provide a misleadingly low estimate of the extent to which codetermination would increase
the costs of corporate decision-making within European firms in general.
211. Williamson, supra note 75, at 1207-9, also argues that labor representation on a corpora-
tion's board of directors in a voting capacity (as in codetermination), rather than merely for informa-
tional purposes, is inappropriate. His reasoning, however, is somewhat different from that offered
here. Workers' firm-specific investments, he claims, can be adequately protected through contractual
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In many firms, to be sure, one-third of the board seats would probably
be insufficient to have any important influence on corporate decision-mak-
ing; control would effectively remain exclusively in the hands of capital.
And in those firms, such a large labor contingent on the board would be
unnecessary at best, and at worst would mislead workers into thinking
that they participate meaningfully in direct control over firm policy.
C. The New Employee Cooperative Corporation Statutes
Several states have recently enacted special statutes providing for the
incorporation of worker cooperatives.212 These statutes do not extend the
available range of organizations beyond those that can be formed under
the business corporation statutes or under well-drafted general cooperative
corporation statutes.213 Rather, they at best provide a simpler statutory
standard form for worker cooperatives and, in the process, give that form
a legislative imprimatur of sorts. As argued above, however, it seems un-
likely that the awkwardness of using existing corporation law to craft
worker cooperatives has played an important role in inhibiting their
proliferation.2"4 Consequently, although these statutes cause no particular
harm,2" 5 there is little reason to believe that their enactment will have
much effect in spreading worker ownership.
D. Prohibition of Investor-Owned Law Firms
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
like the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics that preceded them, explicitly proscribe any arrange-
ment whereby a lawyer serves as an employee of a profit-seeking organi-
devices; it is only investors of capital whose firm-specific investments are so broadly at risk as to
require voting control over the firm. The argument here, in contrast, is that while labor contracting
may suffer from many costly inefficiencies in the absence of worker control of the firm, any effort to
share control between capital and labor through an electoral mechanism such as a firm's board of
directors is likely to be either ineffective or quite costly.
212. E.g., Massachusetts Employee Cooperative Corporations Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
157A (West 1987). Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington
have adopted virtually identical statutes. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, Em-
PLOYEE OWNERSHIP RESOURCE GUIDE 99 (1989).
213. The worker cooperative statutes differ from other corporation statutes in making special pro-
vision for systems of "internal capital accounts" to provide for distributions to members, and in
designating a class of organizations denominated "internal capital account cooperatives." The capital
accounts involved, however, seem equally available under business corporation statutes and general
cooperative corporation statutes. Thus agricultural cooperatives, which are formed under cooperative
or business corporation statutes, often employ complex methods of capital accounting among their
members. See Hansmann, supra note 14.
214. See supra Section IX(A).
215. The statutes are, however, needlessly specialized, vague, and awkwardly drafted (being pig-
gybacked, as they are, onto the general corporation statutes). A more useful reform would be to
redraft the general state cooperative corporation statutes where necessary to make them more func-
tional and more general and, in the process, to make it dear that all forms of consumer and producer
cooperatives, including worker cooperatives, can be formed under them. For some suggestions along
these lines, see Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981).
1814 [Vol. 99: 1749
Worker Ownership
zation that sells legal services to the public if that organization is not
-wholly owned by lawyers who practice in it, as in the case of the conven-
tional law partnership or professional service corporation. 16 Since this
provision of the Model Rules, or a close counterpart, has the force of law
in virtually every state,217 worker-owned firms are presently the only
available form for organizing the practice of law. When the Model Rules
were adopted in 1983, the original draft called for eliminating this restric-
tion. Ultimately, however, the ABA rejected the reform.218
It seems likely that law firms will continue to grow larger and more
internally specialized and complex-a path they have followed consist-
ently for many decades and which they have pursued at an accelerated
pace in the past twenty years.21 This is likely to increase the capital
needs of these firms and to put increasing strain on their governance
mechanisms, as it has in the other service professions. And this, in turn, is
likely to lead to increasing pressure for law firms to follow the other ser-
vice professions in shifting toward investor ownership.220
Should the Model Rules' prohibition of investor ownership be retained
in the face of this pressure, leaving it to market forces alone to determine
whether lawyer ownership will continue to be the exclusive form for or-
ganizing law firms? Similar restrictions on investor ownership of medical
practices were eliminated by preemptive federal legislation more than fif-
teen years ago221 with results that appear generally salutary. Since the
public policy justification for such restrictions seems even less compelling
in law than it was in medicine, 22 2 it is arguably time that they be aban-
doned by lawyers as well.
216. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4, reprinted in T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA, 1988 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 82, 159-60 (1988);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A), DR3-103(A), DR5-107(C) (1981),
reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra, at 1, 29, 30, 42 (1988); CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS Canons 33, 34, 35 (1908), reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra, at 379,
388-89.
217. The Rules, like the Code that preceded them, are typically adopted by the states through
judicial rather than legislative action. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 56-57, 62-63
(1986). Most states have adopted some form of the Model Rules, and of these nearly all have followed
Rule 5.4 without significant variation. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
paras. 01:3, 91:401 (1990).
218. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 469 (1989).
219. See generally M. GALANTER & T. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE GROWTH
AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (forthcoming 1991); Galanter & Palay, Why the Big
Get Bigger: The Promotion to Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1990).
220. See Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year 2000, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 683 (1988); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 111, at 329-31 n.30; Brill, Psst-Wanna Buy a
Hot Stock?, AM. LAW., Nov. 1987, at 3; Brill, War at the Tombstones, AM. LAW., Mar. 1985, at 1.
221. Health Maintenance Organizations Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1982)).
222. See Hansmann, supra note 215, at 538-45; G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 218, at
469-78. To be sure, health maintenance organizations serve an insurance function and thus are likely
to have larger needs for capital than do typical law firms. Consequently, the costs of prohibiting
investor ownership are arguably much smaller in law than in medicine.
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XI. CONCLUSION
The classical model of the business firm, under which formal control is
confined to suppliers of capital while management in turn deals with
workers through market contracting, leaves room for considerable ineffi-
ciency in the form of agency costs between owners and managers and op-
portunistic behavior between the firm and its workers. In theory, worker
ownership promises substantial efficiency improvements in these respects.
And in practice it appears that worker ownership often is more efficient
than investor ownership when the workers involved are highly homogene-
ous. The evidence suggests, however, that direct worker control of the firm
brings substantial costs with a heterogeneous workforce-costs that are
generally large enough to outweigh the benefits that worker ownership
otherwise offers. For similar reasons, true sharing of control between la-
bor and capital is not promising as a route to efficiency.
Consequently, it is difficult to justify public subsidies for worker owner-
ship (such as tax preferences for ESOPs) or policies that mandate a large
role for workers in control at the board level (such as German-style
codetermination). Other forms of worker participation appear to offer bet-
ter prospects for improving on the efficiency of the classical model. For
example, simple profit-sharing plans may be a better approach to increas-
ing incentives for productivity, while works councils, quality circles, labor-
management committees, and informational seats for labor on the board of
directors are probably more suitable means of improving the flow of infor-
mation between management and workers.
It is paradoxical that the aspect of worker ownership often extolled as
its principal virtue-participation in governance of the firm through dem-
ocratic institutions-appears in fact to be its greatest liability. In business
firms as in other settings, political mechanisms operate crudely. In com-
parison to market contracting, they evidently aggregate and represent the
interests of a heterogeneous group relatively inefficiently in all but the
most severe situations of market failure. Even then, fiduciary mechanisms
may generally be a more effective substitute for the market than are polit-
ical institutions: Firms managed for their workers, it appears, often per-
form better than firms managed by their workers.
To be sure, all such conclusions must be tentative. We know too little
about organization theory in general, or about intra-firm political mecha-
nisms in particular, to draw definitive conclusions about the relative effi-
ciency of alternative assignments of earnings and control. Organizational
innovations may yet make worker ownership viable in circumstances
where it has previously failed to make headway. At present, however, it
seems most reasonable to predict that successful instances of worker own-
ership will remain largely confined to firms with highly homogeneous
classes of worker-owners.
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